Happy Holidays

Merry Christmas

& .....

Happy New Year

Updating Democracy Index and Economic Freedom Index

Democracy Index (DI) and Economic Freedom Index (EFI)

In recent report (October 25, 2005) of "WorldAudit.org", the rank of DI and EFI of the following countries (total of 166 nations), in the format of "country name, DI, EFI" are:

Finland, 1, 15
U.K., 10, 7
Canada, 12, 16
U.S., 14, 12
Japan, 18, 39
Taiwan, 27, 27
S. Korea, 32, 45
China, 128, 112
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年尾札記

年尾札記:

吳惠林先生引述經濟學家夏道平先生的話說「真正的經濟學家」應該具有的思路是：

一. 應了解「人」具有異於禽獸的意志、理念和邏輯思考；
二. 人的欲望滿足受外在種種限制，不得不有所選擇，但力求自由選擇；
三. 人在爭取自由過程中不能妨害別人的自由，在互動中形成分工合作；
四. 人類社會的形成和擴大，是由於人的自覺行為之互動，不是靠一個人或少數人的設 計、規畫、指揮或命令而組織成的所謂「團隊」行為；
五. 「非團隊」行為是分工合作社會所賴以達成、擴大的基礎，是「無形手」（指市場）的作用，是「長成的社會秩序」；
六. 有形手（指政府）不應牽制或阻礙「無形手」運作，只能為其去礙；
七. 自由市場和政府間的關係是後者對於前者的運作，只可維護或給予便利，不得有干擾。

Taiwan's December Election

Big Eagle wants to share this article on Taiwan's Democracy with you. The article is distributed by "Foreign Policy Research Institute", http://www.fpri.org/

Jacques deLisle is Director of FPRI's Asia Program and Professor of Law at the University of Pennsylvania.
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TAIWAN'S DEMOCRACY AND LESSONS FROM YET ANOTHER ELECTION
by Jacques deLisle

December 16, 2005

Barely two weeks after President Bush pointed to Taiwan as an example of democracy that the PRC would do well to emulate,Taiwanese voters went to the polls yet again. This time, they selected county magistrates, county and city council members, and township heads. The outcome was a stinging defeat for the Democratic Progressive Party,ubiquitously if somewhat misleadingly referred to as Taiwan's ruling party because of its control of the presidency and, in turn, the premiership and the executive branch agencies in Taiwan's problematically mixed presidential-parliamentary system. The DPP won only six of the twenty-three county magistracies, down a third from its previous share. Fourteen seats--a gain of five--went to the Kuomintang, which is generally referred to as the opposition party despite its functional control of the legislature. The KMT's allies in the "pan-blue" captured the remaining county magistracies. Below the magistrate level, the DPP and its "pan-green" partners fared even worse.

The balloting also marked another milepost in the rapid development and consolidation of Taiwan's democracy. Although marred by charges of electoral irregularities and improper campaign methods, the "three-in-one" election
produced results that won wide acceptance as valid. In these respects, the voting echoed the national legislative elections of a year earlier. And it continued the recovery from the divisive presidential election of March 2004 in which the outcome likely turned on the eleventh-hour shooting of President Chen Shui-bian and Vice President Annette Lu, and which brought charges from the defeated pan-blue camp asserting that the incumbents' come-from-behind victory was illegitimate and the assassination attempt staged. This brief rattling of the system aside, the December 2005 election joins an ever-lengthening list of peaceful and legitimate elections that have been held since Taiwan's democratic transformation began nearly two decades ago.

While one can count seats won and lost at the county and lower levels,or rounds of legitimate elections peacefully held, little else about the meaning of the recent balloting is certain. Conflicting interpretations abound concerning what motivated voters and what the outcome portends for foreign and domestic policy, constitutional revision efforts, upcoming parliamentary and presidential elections, and party alignment and reform. Amid such uncertainties, the election nonetheless did reflect and extend two broad, and not-so-salutary, features of recent Taiwanese politics.

POLITICS IS NOT LOCAL

Former Speaker of the House Tip O'Neill famously said that all politics is local. This month's elections support a nearly opposite aphorism for Taiwan: local politics never remains local. It may well be that local issues were first
in voters' minds in this election. Key and closely watched races did focus on the attributes and actions of individual candidates, including allegations of vote-buying, health problems, improper disclosures of medical records, character assassination, the impropriety of a candidate's attempt to reclaim a county office after a long absence in central government posts, and so on. Nonetheless, national and international issues loomed large. Accurately or not, the election was often depicted and seen as a mid-term referendum on Chen's presidency and DPP rule and as a dry-run for national legislative elections in 2007 and the presidential election in 2008. National leaders from both camps--including President Chen, Vice President Lu, presumptive pan-blue presidential nominee Ma, DPP chairman and aspiring presidential candidate Su Tseng-chang, and Legislative Yuan Speaker Wang Jin-pyng--campaigned hard for magistrate candidates and effectively "nationalized" the races.

The election thus became, to a significant degree, about non-local issues, such as DPP governance, the merits of the KMT alternative, the economy, corruption and scandals, and money in politics. Any election that is cast in large part as a judgment on the Chen presidency and DPP government or as an expression of preference for future pan-blue or pan-green rule inevitably also implicates cross-Strait relations. While there is much room for disagreement about how different the mainland policies of the DPP or KMT really are, the two principal parties and their respective allies have been at pains to differentiate themselves from one another on mainland relations, with each accusing the other of irresponsibility toward Taiwan's interests. A vote for either pan-blue or pan-green therefore has to be read as a vote that is in part about cross-Strait policy.

Moreover, national party leaders explicitly brought questions of mainland policy into the county elections. The high-profile visits to China by former KMT chairman Lien Chan and People First Party chief James Soong came after the late 2004 Legislative Yuan elections, making the December 2005 contest the first significant occasion for the parties to seek voters' endorsement or rejection of the pan-blue's new approach to Beijing. In the months preceding the election, PFP legislators also pressed a "peace promotion" bill and pan-blue representatives backed budget measures that would have undercut the long-standing and DPP-favored Mainland Affairs Council as the institutional vehicle for cross-Strait policy.

During the campaign, Chen and other pan-green leaders pointed to such developments as showing that a vote for the pan-blue was, in effect, a vote to compromise Taiwan's functional sovereignty and its interests more generally. Chen and Lee Teng-hui, former president and godfather of the pan-green Taiwan Solidarity Union, cast the election as a choice between the KMT's position of collaborating with the PRC regime and the DPP's position of protecting Taiwan. At the same time, pan-blue advocates argued that the Chen administration, unlike the pan-blue, was unable to make progress with Beijing on issues vital to Taiwan's national interests and had a dangerous penchant for risky pro-independence stances.

Both sides tendered predictions and threats about the election's fallout. The KMT's Ma asserted that a pan-blue victory would force Chen to be more accommodating in cross-Strait policy; Chen responded that it could lead his
administration instead to take a tougher line with the PRC. The administration later explained the president's remarks as not a definitive policy shift but rather as a rejoinder to Ma's provocation, an assertion of the administration's vigilance should an emboldened pan-blue be overzealous in pursuing accommodation with Beijing, and an empirical observation based on the negative impact on cross-Strait relations of prior pan-blue victories or policy gambits.

This is not to say that the results of the county elections are primarily an expression of voter sentiments on cross-Strait issues. Rather, the injection of mainland policy into these local elections (1) showed how inescapable questions of mainland policy have become in Taiwan's politics, and (2) raised the risk that the outside world-always focused on implications for Taiwan-PRC-U.S. relations would infer from the campaign new and unsettling developments in Taiwan's China policies, or would perceive in the results a popular verdict on the two camps' contrasting approaches to dealing with Beijing.

In both these respects, the 2005 elections faintly echoed the Legislative Yuan elections of 2004. That vote too was supposed to be about local issues. But this changed during the campaign's final weeks. At that critical juncture, with
the pan-green hopes for a legislative majority imperiled, President Chen intervened and energetically sought to rally voters in support of his administration's cross-Strait positions. It remains far from certain that critical groups of voters cast their ballots on that basis, and the pan-blue did retain control of the legislature. Nonetheless, Chen's intervention prompted the outside world--and especially U.S. observers--to view the elections through the "Taiwan sovereignty" lens that Chen deployed. It prompted a milder version of President Bush's rebuke to Chen (warning Chen against unilateral moves to change the cross-Strait status quo) at his meeting with Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao in December 2003.

The dynamic seems unlikely to abate for the early 2008 vote for president and the late 2007 vote for the legislature. The 2007 election, of course, parallels the 2004 elections, which saw the late turn to an emphasis on cross-Strait policy issues. Despite electoral district reforms that are expected to lead to a greater focus on local issues, there is little assurance that questions of mainland relations and policies will not intrude-not least because of the legacy of polarization that the 2005 elections reinforce and the shadow the looming 2008 presidential election will cast. Like all Taiwanese presidential elections, the 2008 campaign is likely to bring cross-Strait issues to the fore.

The 2006 elections for the mayoralties of Taipei and Kaohsiung may well exhibit a similar pattern. Like the 2005 county elections, they will be for posts one rung below the national level. Like the most hotly contested and closely watched of the county magistrate elections in 2005, the one for Taipei county, the two big-city mayor races are especially laden with national implications. Where the Taipei county magistracy was significant because it had provided a four-term green outpost in Taiwan's blue north and because DPP Chairman Su was the retiring incumbent, the 2006 Taipei mayoral election will be for the post that presumptive pan-blue presidential candidate Ma will be vacating and that President Chen had held before him. Like Taipei county in 2005, Taipei city in 2006 will be an election for a swing district, one winnable by pan-green candidates despite its location in the blue north.

At the core of the pan-green heartland, Kaohsiung is a place where a loss would be a major defeat for the DPP and a repudiation of its performance and policies on a range of issues, primarily good governance but potentially China as well. And such a setback is conceivable, given the pan-blue's ability to score occasional victories there and an ongoing scandal over a mass-transit project that has dogged the current, DPP city administration and that has its origins during the mayorship of current DPP prime minister and presidential aspirant Frank Hsieh.

As in most countries, Taiwan's two largest cities, along with the urbanized Taipei county, are relatively cosmopolitan places where foreign and national policies typically are thought to be more salient for voters. Given this and the mayoral elections' closeness to the 2007-08 electoral cycle, these elections will be scrutinized for their implications for national politics and, thus, cross-Strait policy.

One factor that contributes to the tendency for the politics of cross-Strait policy to pervade local elections is the high frequency of elections in Taiwan. This "election overload" is also a troublesome feature of Taiwanese democracy that the 2005 county elections have underscored.

PROBLEMS OF THE PERPETUAL CAMPAIGN

A saying attributed to Chinese peasants during the 1930s and 1940s held that the Japanese killed too much, the Nationalists taxed too much, and the Communists met too much. Taiwan today suggests an addendum: the democrats vote too much.

The density of elections with national scope or significance is striking. Since March 2004, Taiwanese voters have gone to the polls to choose a president, consider a pair of "defensive referenda" concerning possible weapons acquisition policies and terms for cross-Strait relations, elect a legislature, empanel a National Assembly to adopt constitutional amendments, and select county magistrates and councilors and lower level officials. After a brief respite, Taiwan's electorate will face at least three key contests through March 2008: mayors of the two largest and most important cities, the national legislature, and the presidency.

Politicians and commentators lament the packed electoral calendar. The perceived dangers come in several varieties. The expense of the endless string of elections provided an important argument for holding "three-in-one" elections in 2005. It also entwined with the broader concern over the cost of government to help drive the constitutional amendment shrinking the size of parliament and the increasingly sharp legislative wrangling over budgets, including a long-stalled supplementary appropriation for purchasing weapons from the United States.

Of more interest here, Taiwan's chronic voting risks polarized and paralyzed politics. The frequent elections encourage the tendency to scrutinize local elections for their implications for an upcoming national election. This in turn encourages national-level politicians to interject supra-local issues into each contest. Such tendencies may be inescapable in small and competitive democracies, but the shortness of the electoral cycle in Taiwan makes matters worse.

With each election's result thus seen not only as a measure of parties' current standing but also as a determinant of their prospects in the next election, and with each campaign effectively underway when the prior election ends, officeholders and prospective candidates face strong incentives not to take risks and especially not to risk handing the other side a pre-election political gain. "We can take a more bipartisan approach once the next election is over" is a common sentiment in democratic polities, butit is a problematic one in Taiwan, where the next election always seems only months away. The scope narrows for deals that don't provide immediate pay-offs to all participants. Prospects for inter-branch cooperation and statesmanlike approaches to policy problems are dimmed, and the temptation to score cheap or dramatic political points increases. Stalemate of the sort that has characterized Taiwanese politics is a predictable consequence.

"Voter burnout" is a commonly made prediction in Taiwan. It has not yet materialized. Turnout has continued to surpass 60 percent (with the insignificant exception of the National Assembly election, which chose representatives largely to rubberstamp the constitutional amendments passed by the Legislative Yuan). Still, the worry is pervasive. Were voter turnout to drop sharply, it would make it harder for victors to claim mandates for their preferred policies, making governing more difficult--especially in the
environment of divided government that Taiwan has had since 2000. The prospect of lower turnout also reduces the utility of one high-visibility political-governmental tool, since referenda can pass only if a majority of the eligible electorate votes.

Moreover, expectations that fewer voters may go to the polls encourage each bloc to play to its more extreme base and to vilify its opponents. Many observers attribute the turn to ideological messages and the invocation of cross-Strait issues in recent local races to this endgame drive to energize the hardcore partisan vote. On this view, those efforts to rally these core supporters became especially urgent because of party elites' fears that many among the broad center of moderate voters might stay home, despite recognition that playing to the base increased the likelihood that those fears would in fact be realized.

The constitutional change to restructure the legislature into smaller, single-member districts is expected to (1) reduce polarization, by denying a seat to, say, a fourth-place finisher with fringe followers in a four-member
district; (2) sharpen the focus on truly local issues, by giving voters a sole representative to hold accountable and by tying a legislator's incentives to the interests of a more compact and coherent community; and (3) consolidate a two-party system, by making it more likely that a three-way race will result in the contested seat's going to the candidate of whichever of the two blocs fields a single candidate.

While such expectations are perfectly in keeping with political science theory, it is far from certain that all of them will come true. The 2005 county magistrate contests seemed to offer preliminary validation to the third hypothesis: all but one of the 21 principal county magistracies went to KMT or DPP candidates; most contests saw only two serious candidates; and truly three-way races were confined almost entirely to districts where the bloc that divided either had so little support that unity was unlikely to have led to victory or such strong support that unity seemed unnecessary to secure the seat.

As to the other two propositions, however, the December elections provide grounds for skepticism. The inherent localism of those elections and the single-seat structure of the magistracies failed to check the campaigns' invocation of national and international issues or ideological and partisan appeals. Moreover, the election reinforced a regional dimension in Taiwan's politics that in some respects parallels the U.S.'s notorious division into red and blue states. While Taiwanese have long spoken of the "blue north" and the "green south," the county elections produced a map with an exceptionally clear dividing line. Although that line may not hold for long and still contains one small exception, for now it separates contiguous zones of solid green and solid blue.

THE ROAD AHEAD FOR CROSS-STRAIT RELATIONS

In addition to confirming Taiwan's robust democratization, the December elections are important for the sweeping KMT victory and as an apparent harbinger of pan-blue success in the 2008 presidential balloting. Yet, it is far from clear that this election portends a significant shift in a traditionally "blue" or pro-accommodation direction for cross-Strait policy.

While the pan-blue camp appears to be on a roll, its electoral victories coincide with a "greening" of the blues, particularly on matters relevant to cross-Strait relations. The median Taiwanese voter arguably remains a consistent shade of teal on such issues and perhaps more generally. True, the 2005 mainland visits by Lien and Soong looked--especially to pan-green critics--like a shift back toward the "pro-reunification" approach that Chen and his KMT predecessor President Lee had so sharply eroded. But the dramatic pilgrimages by former pan-blue standard-bearers has not yet clearly heralded a significant reversal of trends that run generally in the opposite direction. As candidates in the 2004 election, Lien and Soong struck stances on cross-Strait relations and Taiwanese identity that were a good deal closer to Chen's and the DPP's positions than had been the case during their presidential campaigns four years earlier.

As the pan-blue's likely nominee for president in 2008, Ma has sounded more like the Lien-Soong of 2004 than the Lien or Soong of 2000. Some also credit Ma with considerable shrewdness in leaving Lien to take charge of the KMT-CCP dialogue. This approach partly insulates Ma from the risk of such dealings' casting their protagonists in an excessively bluish hue (which is a particular concern for Ma as a waishengren, or "mainlander," candidate who needs significant bentu, or "Taiwanese," support). The tactic also allows Ma an opportunity to "audition" relatively accommodationist cross-Strait initiatives with the electorate, embracing them only if they seem more helpful to the KMT's claims to be the party best able to deal with the mainland than they are harmful to its resilience to charges of failing to safeguard Taiwan's interests and functional sovereignty.

In the immediate aftermath of the KMT victories in the December elections, Ma distanced himself from the suggestion that the outcome signaled a shift in Taiwanese voters' support for the status quo or implied a demand for significant changes in near-term cross-Strait policy. Ma declared that, while the election's winning party favored greater cooperation with China, the voting did not mean that Taiwanese now favored reunification, or any departure from the cross-Strait political status quo.

As for the greens, the implications of their troubles for Taiwan's cross-Strait policies are not simple. A pan-green recovery is highly unlikely by 2008, given the margin of defeat, the responsibility for the losses that leading DPP
presidential contenders Su and Hsieh have had to bear, scandals over the Kaohsiung mass-transit project and insider trading within the presidential office, and the existence of internecine divides that have triggered speculation about the party's possibly splitting up. But a recovery is not impossible. Two and a quarter years is a long time in Taiwanese politics. And the greens' opponents may be less formidable than they appear, given not-yet-healed divisions between the KMT and PFP, rivalries within the KMT and many voters' abiding distrust of the KMT as a ruling party.

The quest for a near-term pan-green resurgence might well herald the party's continuation and extension of Chen-era approaches toward the PRC, or it might involve repositioning on a number of issues, including cross-Strait questions such as easing investment restrictions and providing direct transportation links in order to permit stronger economic ties. The DPP has only begun to grapple with how to allocate blame for its electoral defeats and consider what internal reforms to undertake in response to its rebukes from the voters. That process surely will include debate on overcoming scandals, which is an especially pressing concern given the DPP's long-standing self-positioning as a party of reform; on domestic policy and governance issues, where there is much repair work to be done on the party's image; and on factional politics within the DPP and the larger pan-green bloc, which have been a chronic problem. But the DPP's adjustments may also involve mainland policies and almost certainly will have implications for them.

Chen will remain the president for the next two-plus years and will continue to do much to shape the pan-green stance on cross-Strait matters. While pundits and politicians have differed over the likely magnitude and direction of any post-election change in the Chen administration's approach to dealing with Beijing, it seems likely that mainland relations will be a significant focus during the remainder of Chen's tenure. Given the allocation of powers in Taiwan's constitutional system and the pan-blue's legislative majority, relations with the PRC are one of the few areas in which the president has great independent power to shape policy. Further, Chen is considered to be a man concerned with his legacy, which would include his contributions to safeguarding what he routinely describes as Taiwan's sovereignty and, as some would put it, advancing Taiwan's independence. This augurs no softening of his line on relations with the PRC. On the other hand, some see Chen as wanting to leave behind some accomplishments in improving cross-Strait ties--or at least not wanting to leave all credit for impending advancements to his pan-blue opponents. This, when coupled with the pressure Chen faces from his supporters within the business community, points to pursuit of progress on the three links and other aspects of economic relations.

Finally, there are the reds. China's Taiwan policy has become more savvy. Launching a missile crisis in 1996 gave way to Premier Zhu Rongji's finger-wagging warning in 2000, and to still subtler and less counterproductive tactics for addressing Taiwan's voters and affecting Taiwan's electoral politics in 2004 and since. Inviting Lien and Soong for high-profile, feel-good visits to the mainland and passing an Anti-Secession Law are complicated tactics that have in some respects alienated some of their intended Taiwanese targets but which also have shown enhanced agility in advancing the PRC's cross-Strait agenda with relevant audiences on Taiwan.

Although the Lien-Soong trips deepened suspicions of pan-blue traitorousness in some Taiwanese circles, they also advanced what appears to be a promising Chinese strategy of divide and conquer. They also served to underscore for some Taiwanese the Chen administration's inability to make any progress in dealing with the PRC, including on concrete economic issues that matter a great deal to Taiwan's influential business community and to its economy more broadly. To be sure, the Anti-Secession Law prompted widespread concern and anger in Taiwan. But many Taiwanese at least privately conceded that it also reaffirmed a Chinese tolerance for the status quo (even as it also cautioned against further, unspecified moves toward formal independence, presumably of the sort associated with "deep green" politics in Taiwan).

While some foresee a possibility that China will seek to achieve a breakthrough in cross-Strait relations during Chen's final two and a quarter years in office, capitalizing on his weakened political condition and his imputed interest in leaving a positive legacy in mainland policy, this is not the most likely scenario. Having turned a cold shoulder to Chen for so long and having used the Lien-Soong trips and other means to cultivate the pan-blue, Beijing seems unlikely to strike a deal with Chen in the run-up to an expected pan-blue set of victories in 2007-08, especially not on any terms that Chen would find acceptable. But China's options too are constrained in ways that cannot yet be fully discerned. Given the progress of Taiwanese democracy, the intractable salience of cross-Strait issues in Taiwanese electoral politics, and the frequency of Taiwanese elections, Beijing, like everyone else, must wait and adapt to the outcomes of the recent and upcoming elections.

檢討陳水扁總統的決策及用人機制 / 瞿海源

轉載東森星期講義 --
檢討陳水扁總統的決策及用人機制
2005/12/11 00:05

瞿海源

全國地方三合一選舉，民進黨大敗之後，輿論及民進黨人士多認為陳水扁對敗選要負很大的的責任，但阿扁迄今未公開露面對這樣的指責發表談話。日前陳水扁總統在總統府接見四位獨派資政，資政們轉述總統的談話。也在同一天，阿扁總統電子報也發表陳水扁總統對選舉結果發表的一些意見。就這兩份非正式公開發表的內容來看，陳水扁總統似乎還沒有真正深切地檢討，還是在因應場合的需求，回應乃至討好特定會見的對象。

陳水扁對民進黨敗選負多大責任並不重要，而是要看他到底有沒有「真誠」地在檢討，尤其是來檢討自己。總統個人有無能力和智慧檢討並改進賸餘任期的施政，不僅關乎他個人到底會不會是一個失敗的總統，更對國家整體發展有重大影響。

就阿扁在總統電子報發表類似敗選檢討的談話而言，陳總統大體上是在說一些冠冕堂皇的話，並不是真誠的檢討。他說，知恥近乎勇，選舉結果不理想、施政表現不能得到選民的肯定，他都必須深切反省與檢討。他又承諾，今後將以最高的要求、最嚴格的標準來檢驗每一位團隊成員，包括他自己在內，重新建立起「清廉、勤政、愛鄉土」的信譽，積極贏回民眾對扁政府的信賴與支持。這些場面話，阿扁說來很習慣，也很輕鬆，但是他到底會不會使澈底的真正的檢討呢，恐怕是很大的疑問。

阿扁對所謂獨派四資政發表的談話，也正好展現陳水扁總統依舊唯我獨尊，沒有自我檢討的意思。因為總統府並沒有對這個會談發表新聞，或發表了新聞卻未被報導，新聞所報導的是與會者所轉述，或許會有些出入，但也未見總統府澄清，我們大約還是可以認定陳水扁總統在會談中表達了下面幾個重要看法：

──販選後，陳水扁總統並沒有慰留行政院長謝長廷
──未來的內閣要能貫徹他的改革思考
──在謝揆任內，現在已經沒有外交、兩岸和國防的「總統權」
──今後兩年不必再向在野黨妥協，一定要回到基本面
──第二次經發會，是為發展本土經濟，而絕不是要藉機「拚開放」

也許是阿扁向獨派四大資政交心，有意無意間說些真心話，也可能是為了對大老有所交待，說話要有些擔當才這麼說。不過，無論如何，總統對閣揆在第三者面前有意見，甚至有貶抑有抱怨，大約都是很不妥當的。大老們轉述這麼嚴重的話，總統府沒有澄清，大家就會相信總統確實這麼說了。阿扁若真是說了類似並沒有慰留行政院長的話，或是真的說了張俊雄和游錫坤院長任內自己有外交、兩岸和國防權力，現在卻沒有了，這都是對行政院長很嚴重的指控。果真如此，行政院長非立即遞出正式辭呈不可。

對於實質上到底會有什麼改革更張，從目前總統電子報和大老的轉述，雖然還看不太清楚，但是這中間還是表達了阿扁幾個關鍵的基本立場。第一、他似乎有意要有一個可以貫徹他主張的內閣，包括閣揆在內，至於他的主張卻是模模糊糊的，說是他的改革思考，不知道是改革什麼。第二、他表示已經沒有和在野政黨妥協的需要，要回歸基本面。只是這個基本面是什麼，也是不清不楚。面對獨派大老說這樣的話，大家可能會聯想到阿扁又要向台獨基要派靠攏。面對依舊是朝小野大的局面，又特別是在縣市長選舉大敗之後，阿扁反而擺出不妥協的強硬態度，這樣就會做得好基本面的事？第三、他特別強調第二次經改會不是拚開放，而是要促進本土經濟發展，也是在面對獨派大老說這樣的話，於是二次經改在政治上，特別是兩岸政治上也就定了調。

我們不知道，陳水扁總統依靠什麼樣的機制提出以上這些攸關國家發展的觀點，甚至可說是未來改革施政的方向。不過，仔細檢討起來，阿扁總統並沒有真正的有效機制來做這些決定。他不是靠資政做決策，因為四大資政就在他面前做客，他也不是靠國策顧問，也不是靠總統府那個局，似乎也不是靠祕書長副祕書長。那麼他就靠自己做決定。讓人擔心的也正是這個狀況。因為五年多來，陳水扁總統似乎很少做對什麼決策，使得中央政府，也是他自己所稱的扁政府施政效能一直提升不起來。其實，陳水扁的決策和用人機制是扁政府至今仍然困坐愁城邁向失敗的主要根由。應該徹底檢討的也就是這個關鍵所在。
（●作者瞿海源，台大社會學系教授，中研院社會學研究所研究員，澄社社員。本文取自東森集團所屬的民眾日報。照片取自瞿海源─學術資訊網。）

A Thought after Taiwan's Election on 12/03

從臺灣的選舉看臺灣和大陸民衆的區別
2005/12/04 (From ETToday)

山水之颠 (中國浙江人)

12月3日，臺灣進行了「三合一」地方選舉，本人因為電腦技術水準還可以，通過網路瞭解了臺灣更多的政治形態，也形成了自己獨特的觀點，而不是以中共洗腦的方式來看問題，下面就談談自己所謂的「獨特」觀點吧！

12月2日，本人看到了臺北縣三合一選舉的現場，說實在的，那個場面現在的大陸已經很少看到了，要說大陸有這種場面，那估計是5.4運動期間和抗日戰爭時期了，但臺灣的這種文化卻也折射了臺灣人特有的個性文化，那就是說話鼓動性強，很煽情！每個政治人物必須就是天生的演員，否則沒有人會買你的帳。相反，大陸因為是一黨獨大，強調個人服從組織，因此個性很差，好像很多政治人物都是鐵板一塊，和人民保持很大的距離，給大眾充滿了神秘感！

很難說這種模式的孰優孰劣，先說說臺灣的優勢吧，我們有很多臺灣來的老師，臺灣來的老師的一大特點是，說話很隨意，比如愛開黃色笑話調節氣氛等，因此每個臺灣來的老師個性都很鮮明，每個臺灣老師就是一個很受期待的人物，期望他有新的觀點。但大陸的老師就不一樣了，沒開始就知道他想要講什麼東西，結果也是「不出所料」，因此從人才的層面來說，臺灣的這種文化成就了很多個性鮮明的人才，有點像古代中華的百家爭鳴，非常可貴。說完臺灣的優勢後，再說說他的劣勢吧，臺灣因為開放＆自由，卻也帶來了問題，這個巨大的問題是口水不斷，效率極地，總統的權威掃地，世界上可怕沒有一個地區的總統沒有像阿扁這麼沒尊嚴了吧，好像大家都不尊敬他，但他還是能做最高的領導人，因此，這幾年臺灣經濟的持續下滑，和政治過度自由是有直接關係的，可惜的是負面效果由百姓承擔，所以制度上應該要有改進的空間。

再說說大陸吧，大陸由於高度的集權，很多新的觀點都被控制，因此好像大家鐵板一塊，有觀點不感說，有牢騷不能當眾發，還有致命的一點是，政治人物是為上級服務，不是為百姓服務，因此腐敗很嚴重，拍馬屁很嚴重，利益集團很強大，百姓相當無奈，更沒有人為百姓代言，農村也搞所謂的民主，但向臺灣一樣，搞的亂哄哄，最後大家還不相信選上的可以幹什麼，呵呵。但也不是說集權沒有任何好處，他的好處就是效率很高，你不幹也得幹，不想幹也得幹，得罪百姓發展經濟可以，但得罪上級的政策維護百姓利益，或許你的烏紗帽就要丟了。因此大陸決定的事情效率很高，整個策略只要中央咬牙，一般都能幹成，大陸標榜的就是集中優勢力量幹大事嘛。

因此大陸和臺灣發展出不同類型的多元文化，這是社會制度的使然，但是我們感到悲哀的事，我們不能和我們的臺灣同胞進行交流，上次我和臺灣的朋友交談，大家都想早上在溫州，下午去臺北。臺灣和大陸同文同種，和朋友交流很方便，很自在。這是和那些黃頭發藍眼睛的朋友交流所沒有的感覺，和臺灣的朋友談話也有很多話題，我們就像一個提問生，因為我們大陸的老百姓對臺灣很陌生，很好奇。因此我最後的觀點是：大陸不要天天拿拳頭嚇唬臺灣，臺灣不要天天和大陸耍嘴皮子，不知道那邊先妥協，不知道哪邊可以先相信對方。一樣的同胞不一樣的想法和個性是很好的，但我們希望不要在政客的操弄下，發展成對對方一樣的仇恨，大陸需要想臺灣學習，臺灣需要和大陸共用尊嚴。

因此，一樣的血，一樣的淚，卻有不一樣的思想，這是制度對蒼生百姓的迫害，臺灣的朋友，何時才能大家多些提煉和包容。大陸的人們，請你們放下對臺灣的成見吧！人民隔絕，政黨利益集團的也請你們少些操弄，多些真誠。注：臺灣當局說陸委會的吳主任要來大陸談，我想民進黨真的想推動，這很好，要是中共還能答應，那會更好，因為我就是想和臺灣的朋友交流，不管他什麼黨。

BigEagle Remark: It is good to see how Chinese envies the democratic process in the recent Taiwanese election.

A Story of a Blind Musician

有一則故事是這樣說的：

一位彈奏三弦的盲人渴望重見天日。他遍訪名醫，有人介紹他求見一位在深山修行的師父。師父答應了他的要求，為他開了一張能讓他看得見的藥方。「但是」，師父說：「你得彈斷一千根弦。」

他無奈的帶著失明的小徒弟，心懷著一絲希望，遊走四方。他走遍大江南北，賣唱彈琴為生。冬去春來，年復一年。

第一千根絃將斷的時候，他們落腳在黃土高原。

夜半，弦斷。
天明，抓藥。

藥房師父接過方單，對著天井透入的強光，正面、反面瞧著，說道：「這只是一張白紙，那來處方？」琴師聽了，琴弦落地，茫然一片。
是日晚，傷心欲絕。細細思索，終而恍然大悟。他看不見，可是他看見了；許多人看得見，卻一直看不見。

隔日，他小心翼翼的將藥方交給徒弟：「我已年邁，此方交付與你。它能夠讓你看得見…..」，「不過」，他頓了一下：「徒兒，你得彈斷一千根弦。」

緣於民眾善忘，每每弊案起，媒體短時間炒熱後，過不久便會忘得一乾二淨，實是宛如看不見的三弦盲人，然而透過TVBS契而不捨的追弊，民眾頓時突見光亮，終看見了政府諸多的缺失與弊案，烙印心頭，這也將成為左右選票流向的依據；至於政府呢？依舊強悍卸責，不知反省甚至急於打壓揭弊的媒體，看得見維護政權的決心，卻看不見民眾心中的憤怒與要求清廉改革的決心，一直看不見民之所需、所求的政府，終必將只是短暫倖免，而當民眾彈奏出「命若琴弦」的淒美曲調後，所彈斷的將不是一千根琴弦，而是彈斷了一個腐朽政府的命脈。


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BigBird notes: This is a story taken from 李福春 article on ETToday (11/05/'05)

Something one should think about.....

Big Eagle says: " I happened to see this article in 中時晚報 (9/26/2005) and I am quite agree with Fan-Jiang's viewpoint. What do you think?"

錯位的政治
范姜泰基

行政院長謝長廷昨日開始下鄉「向人民報告」，雖然當地民眾可能多了1個了解國家政策的管道，但在民主制度下，這種作法卻呈現1種錯位的政治。

身為執政黨，民進黨政府有必要也有義務向立法院做政策說明，藉由理性的交叉辯論，得到政策推動的最大公約數。在立法院居於多數的泛藍陣營不思此圖，讓程序委員會越位成為太上院會，致使多項重大法案停留在門外無盡等待，間接催生謝揆的「向全民報告」。

對於台南民眾來說，水利署以連珠砲速度推銷8年800億治水特別預算，台U的阿伯、阿桑們真聽得懂？在極為有限的時間內，群眾煽動力可能成為報告成功與否的最大關鍵。

民進黨素來以群眾運動起家，掌握現場情緒已經是民進黨政治人物的必備條件，民眾是否了解國家政策並不重要，重點是執政黨用政策糖衣包裝縣市長選戰的內涵，對於民進黨年底選情大有助益。這一切，必須感謝泛藍的「推手」。

其實，真正應該向全民提出報告的應該是國親兩黨。沒有政策支票與執政成績，在野黨必須時時提醒選民自己做了什麼，直接體察民意是在野重返執政的不二法門。但反觀國親兩黨，以阻擋謝揆上台沾沾自喜、以攔下軍購案29次為重大成就，在廟堂上高來高去的結果，絲毫不能讓支持者釋疑「重大法案到底要不要處理？」

要負責的執政黨不需負責，體制上不需負責的在野黨不斷高喊「向人民負責」，台灣錯位政治的根源，其實只是政治精英們錯亂的頭腦。

民主奇蹟與民主文化

民主奇蹟與民主文化

李英偉
台美基金會理事

台美基金會在2003年以台美基金會特別獎頒發給李登輝前總統, 並贈于刻有 ”台灣民主之父” 的獎牌讚揚李總統在任內對台灣民主化的貢獻. 引用張炎憲教授 (現任國史館館長) 在他的文章 “李登輝總統的歷史定位” 裡的話 “…任上推動寧靜革命, 使台灣步上民主自由的社會. 吸納反對運動陣營的意見, 廢除動員勘亂體制, 修正刑法一百條, 廢除黑名單, (使) 台獨人士可自由返台. 言論, 思想自由獲得保障, … 台灣因此步入民主自由的國家.” 當時身為基金會會長的我以及創會人王桂榮夫婦, 和基金會理事們都把獎牌贈送給李總統那一刻的欣喜銘記在心.

同樣在2003年, 呂秀連副總統曾在多次演講中提起 “台灣的三項奇蹟” – 經濟奇蹟, 民主奇蹟, 及和平奇蹟. 如果我們回顧從公元50 年代到2003年那段歷史的演變, 我們都會同意經濟奇蹟的存在和民主奇蹟的發展. 但是和平奇蹟卻是還在沙盤推演階段, 應該是屬於 ”和平尚未達成, 同胞仍需努力” 的目標. 數十萬海內外台灣人不是才在今年三月二十六日在世界各地的街道遊行, 抗議中國的 “反分裂法” 嗎?

台灣過去的奇蹟確實是有奇特的本質. 孫慶餘先生 (台灣政論家) 在 “理性的狡獪” 中提到 “.. 這些奇蹟 (如民主奇蹟) 都是 “由上而下” 發動的”. 早期執政黨如果沒有生存的危機, 就不會制訂經濟政策而產生經濟奇蹟. 公元80 年代如果沒有選舉的壓力和決戰的危機, 執政黨也不會廢除勘亂法及修正刑法而造成民主奇蹟.

民主 (Democracy) 在目前是一個時髦的名詞. 美國布希總統成天都說要把美國的民主推進到極權國家. 連一些軍人政權 – 如巴基斯坦 – 也說要實施民主統治. 問題是這些人了解民主有多少? 美國現行的政體是民主政治的範本嗎? 有一個組織叫WorldAudit.org 整年都在收集資料, 然後每季發表他們的評估. 依據他們最近的報告, 民主指數最高第一名是芬蘭, 美國居15 名, 日本列為30名, 台灣42名, 而中國是129名.

理想的民主國家有如眾人希望的 “甜蜜家庭”. 然而家家有本難唸的經, 每個國家有她特別具有的歷史, 文化背景以及宗教和經濟的條件. 難道我們可以要求每一個國家都要改變為符合某一個範典國家的政體嗎? 難道每個家庭都能改變成國家指定的某一種甜蜜家庭嗎 ? 答案當然是不可能, 而且也不可以的. 因為這麼做就是違反聯合國的人權宣言. 民主的觀念是可以培養或是由國外輸入, 但是民主政體是不能移植的, 因為政治體制需要當地人民的積極參與, 才能建立符合他們的憲法去實施民主政治. 單單有選舉辦法, 並以為贏得多數票就是人民的選擇將會很容易變成假民主或是偽裝的民主 (Sham Democracy).

“民主” 就是說國家的統治或一切權利都是屬於人民. 古代希臘的民主就是這樣的型態. 但是現代的民主政治都是少數統治多數, 人民個人並不親自掌握或行使政治權利, 而是在於有效地約束這些少數的統治者. 可是當人民把行使權利委託那一批少數, 人民個人的自由需要有充分的保證, 不然離開自由的民主是不會穩定的.

在台灣的政壇評論中, 常見到 “民粹” 或 “民粹主義” 這名詞. 主義是一種政治觀念, 一種社會運動, 也是一種政治策略. 所以在一個複雜的社會中, 人們由不同角度看同一件事就會有不同的結論. 民粹主義 (Populism) 是個極端平民化的政治觀念. 它把平民化及大眾化作為政治目的. 基本上民粹主義是反對現代的代議 “精英主義”. 雖然民粹重視人民的意志, 激發民主理想, 但是它的負面就是常常使人認為在蠱惑民心, 進展假民主或極端的民族主義, 鼓動盲目的排外情緒. 美國3K黨的法西斯主義, 種族主義以及對外國人的恐懼症就是一些例子. 民粹與民主的共同點是兩者都是主張主權在民, 人民統治國家. 現代的民主國家認為代議民主是人民行使主權的現實機構, 但是民粹主義卻認為代議民主是等於虛偽的 “自由民主”. 民粹主義又強調群眾的整體性, 所以它也被稱為 “民族民粹主義”. 當民族民粹主義受到外敵威脅的時候, 它會轉化為 “民粹民族主義”, 也因而把 “人民” 對 “反人民” 的思想當作 “國內” 對 “國外” 的態度. 希特勒就是以 “內聚國力, 外抗強權” 為名, 發動民粹取得政權, 並把國會比喻成 “國家發展的絆腳石” 而把國會解散, 也把德國民主共和國瓦解了.

民粹主義的興起並沒有和經濟的蕭條有關, 早年蘇聯的農民革命就是一個例子. 但是它與人民對政府的不公正, 腐敗, 及無能感到的失望有密切的關係. 在脆弱的民主政體中, 別有用心的政治對手就可以宣傳鼓動來引起群眾的失落感, 民粹主義也就產生.

台灣從50年代以來, 經過經濟奇蹟而使一般民眾愈加富裕. 良好的社會經濟也有助於民主制度的發展. 一搬來講, 民主的要素包括下列七項:
(一) 一般人民的富裕,
(二) 良好的經濟制度以防止少數超富壟斷經濟資源,
(三) 多數的中產階級,
(四) 文明的社會,
(五) 和諧的族群,
(六) 民主文化 – 如包容, 尊重, 正義, 公平, 和追求真理的精神.
(七) 來自國外的影響力.
我們從上列的七項要素來看, 台灣在當時已經具有前四項以及第七項 – 尤其是來自美國的影響. 所以台灣在經濟建設後, 有民主的發展應該是水到渠成的.

政治及社會學家 Dankwart A. Rustow 在他的 “民主社會轉型的模式” 裡把民主的發展過程分為四個階段:
(一) 政治上有民族認同,
(二) 民族共同體的經歷期 – 民主的發展必定會經過一段衝突. 如果衝突過於劇烈, 就會撕裂了民族的統一. 如果衝突產生鬥爭而一方以絕對優勢壓倒了對方, 那就會關閉了通往民主的道路,
(三) 轉型前期 – 沒有定論的衝突引起各方妥協, 採納分享權利的民主原則.
(四) 轉型後期 – 民主的原則逐漸由妥協, 容忍變成習慣並且真誠地信奉它. 民主政體穩定地建立. 換一句話說, 民主政體不容意識型態之爭, 只有妥協 (Give and Take) 的政治.

台灣的民主奇蹟確實在適當的環境中產生了. 但是台灣民主發展的情況, 目前還在 Rustow 轉型模式的第三階段 – 轉變前期. 台灣已經具備了許多民主政體的要素, 現在需要的是加強族群的和諧及加強民主文化的培育. 如此才能進入第四階段而建立完善的民主政體. 民主文化的建立需要把民主精神溶貫在教育和社會裡面. 首先要做的是除去中國政壇的 “醬缸文化” – 就是慣性做法. 譬如自私, 冷酷, 猜忌, 崇拜權勢, 同流合污, 虛驕恍惚等等 (請參閱柏楊先生的著作如 “醜陋的中國人” (1984): “醬缸震盪” (1995); “我們要活得有尊嚴” (2003)).

台灣要建立完善的民主政體, 必須要促進族群的和諧以及培養民主文化, 並且把它融合在台灣文化. 這樣才能落實民主奇蹟並發揚光大之, 才能以自由民主的台灣做為其他追求民主政治的國家之榜樣.

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BigBird Notes: This article is submitted to Taiwanese-American Foundation for its 2005 TAF Annals to be published in November, 2005.

Unforgetable History

慰安婦影像 烙印成沈默的傷痕

【中時電子報 2005/8/09】


丁榮生／台北報導三位年過80的老阿嬤─蘇寅嬌、盧滿妹、蔡桂英，昨日在《沈默的傷痕─日軍慰安婦歷史圖像書》的出版記者會上公開亮相，蘇寅嬌在眾人的見證下，沈痛地說出：「都已經戰後60年了，日本政府欠我們一個道歉。」

三位阿嬤都講著客家話，蔡桂英的兒子昨日也隨行，當大家為他們獻花之際，這幾位看得出來還特別去做頭髮、穿上平日較少穿的花衣服的老阿嬤，心中仍浮現無限悸動！盧滿妹還趁攝影機閃光燈較少之際，偷偷地低下頭，拿手去拭了一下眼角。

這本由商周出版的《沈默的傷痕─日軍慰安婦歷史圖像書》，在封面還刊著一張老阿嬤當年第一次面對大眾時，戴著面罩的素顏照片，並書寫著「撫摸著肚子上的那道傷疤，瘖啞地唱著變調青春曲。他們的命運裂痕，是台灣磨滅不了的歷史記憶」。

由台北市婦女救援基金會賴采兒、吳慧玲、游如棻所著，並邀約中國時報攝影中心主任黃子明、蘋果日報攝影沈君帆及日籍、現任韓國「日軍性奴隸博物館」攝影師兼研究員矢山鳥宰，共同著作的這本「血淚之書」。甚至也有上海的蘇智良教授，將大陸的資料寄來台灣，最後並邀到美國密西根州立大學英文系教授馬聖美來共同翻譯。

這本書從慰安婦制度的歷史真相、1990年代倖存衛安婦挺身而出、在正義與人權之間及台灣慰安婦走過60年滄桑等篇章，讓讀者可以梗概了解那一段歷史的點滴。昨日蘇寅嬌、盧滿妹與蔡桂英，雖以緩慢而吃力的國語表達他們內心的情緒，但對那段日據時期，被騙到海南島去從事性服務的難堪傷痛的往事，仍然要大家先認識這段歷史的感慨。蘇寅嬌說：「我17歲就被騙到海南島，今天出來向大家說明，不是日本人說是我們自己願意的。」

由於對日本提出控告並要求對慰安婦平反補償，是在2002年結合台灣、大陸、韓國等同時進行，雖然不順利，但也讓大家更知道日本戰爭惡行。游如棻昨日感慨地說：「阿嬤歷經這麼大的災難，其實值得年輕人做為借鏡，他們堅強地生存至今，我們年輕人有什麼理由咳聲嘆氣呢？」

書中寫著一位秀妹阿嬤，她於書上指出，1940年被騙去作日軍慰安婦，在高雄港上軍艦時，軍醫喝令大家脫光衣服檢查，誰也不敢反抗，雖身體不斷顫抖，但被迫赤裸裸的經歷，是她一輩子抹不去的痛苦記憶。

Taiwan after Recent Typhoon

BigEagle is busy traveling these days including more than a week time in Taiwan. He saw events like Daiyu Islands incidents, election of the Chairman of KMT, then read about the aftermath of the latest typhoon. BigEagle found the following article by "Taijen" sums up the recent social-political status quite well. Therefore BigEagle post the article here for futher discussion on these issues in near future.

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台灣的困頓

台人

「嗚呼！滅六國者，六國也，非秦也；族秦者，秦也，非天下也。嗟夫！使六國各愛其人，則足以拒秦；秦復愛六國之人，則遞三世可至萬世而為君，誰得而族滅也。秦人不暇自哀，而後人哀之；後人哀之，而不鑑之，亦使後人而復哀後人也。」

這是杜牧《阿房宮賦》的最後一段，阿房宮是秦始皇一統江湖後，為紀念「跨世紀」的驕傲，請求民間共襄盛舉(其實是橫征暴賦)，所構建的帝王宮殿，所謂民脂民膏，可惜在「秦失其鹿」的打江山過程中，被項羽輕易地放了一把火，延燒3個月。這邊出現一個矛盾，人民痛恨秦始皇剽竊錢財蓋阿房宮，卻寬恕項羽蠻橫放火燒阿房宮，視為打倒秦始皇的象徵，同樣是暴行，而且後者對人民的貢獻遠低於前者(一把火燒了是什麼都沒剩，強蓋阿房宮至少有名勝古蹟可供憑弔以及建築工藝的流傳)，卻遭遇不同詮釋，真是雙重標準，其實這才是中國歷史問題的關鍵，爭取民心是大原則，卻不是行動的指導方針──

就秦始皇而言，統一文字、度量衡，實乃國家邁入基礎建設必備的客觀條件，建造一座政治文化中心的宮殿建築也是勢在必行，由此觀之，秦「不愛」六國之人嗎？不，他是愛六國之民的，因為秦人與六國之人均為「吾土吾民」，都可同等享受大秦國富民強的尊嚴，從而進入太平盛世，可惜他太躁進了，忽略了中國農民本來就是「日出而作、日落而息、鑿井而飲、耕田而食，帝力何有於我哉」，一旦實質生活利益受到侵害，馬上「拔劍而起」，在這個「小」地方失卻民心，加上有心人士的挑撥，終於釀成「全國性」的反秦。

就項羽而言，乏善可陳的悲劇英雄，暴虎馮河的匹勇，缺乏恆心毅力(很像今日的台灣人)，只不過躬逢其盛，因勢利導，把阿房宮燒給大家爽一下，把搶來的物資分給愛吃的人，這不是治國，這叫「叛國」，至少叫「土匪」，但他真實地照顧了中國農民的實質生活利益，所以反秦成功，但這種格局絕對不足以成就太平盛世。

按照這樣的歷史微觀角度觀照今日台灣所面臨的困頓，我們才訝然發現，今日的台灣人就像躲在井底的青蛙、偏偏喜歡拿根吸管看天，因此，我們看到所謂的改革者其表象的「項羽式」匹勇，竟然可以取得壓倒性的選票，從最近的馬到2004、2000年的扁、乃至於尸位素餐已久的老大人，把一切的倫理像項羽火燒阿房宮一樣，棄若敝屣，這種匹勇竟是台灣人這幾年來賴以生存的精神文明，這種沉悶的氛圍，實際上是一個民族勇於實踐悲壯衰落的最佳時代寫照，舉例來說，倘若台灣真想辦2020年奧運，應該密集地針對這次申奧的幾個城市，對其城市重建、城市規劃、城市人文特色，進行深入分析研究，而不只是畫餅充飢聊以自慰而已，畢竟千里之行(夸父追日)，始於足下。

另一方面，台灣人依然生活在一個日漸崩解的物質文明環境中，不管是土石流的橫行、官員縱欲逞私的貪婪，這些均使台灣無從創造出既滿足人民實質生活利益又能開創出太平盛世的格局，所以台灣格局的萎縮(深怕一旦挑明要「為萬世開太平」，好名怕死、懦弱的台灣人，又自卑自哀地拒絕、錯失永續經營的契機)，充分地體現在地方勢力過度地政治動員，把有限的資源經過民粹式的搶奪分給莫名奇妙的人，譬如有限的教育資源一經163所大學的稀釋、淘洗，往往令身處其中的知識份子既難過又無力挺身而出，最後只得眼睜睜地目賭「學術神器──學位」的隳墮與公開叫賣，接下來就是市場訊號(在資訊經濟學中，學位是一種市場訊號)的紊亂以及魚目混珠、尋租行為的盛行，以致於市場機能整個的崩解，…，我在寫什麼，這些理論對台灣而言太奢侈啦！

因此，在這種精神文明萎靡、物質文明乏善可陳的時代背景下，知識分子只能回到書本聊以自慰，在這種大環境下，我們可以安心於書桌前，實際上是一種幸福，一種可以沉潛、可以做夢大鵬展翅的幸福，一種親眼目睹曾經輝煌的美麗寶島悲壯衰落的歷史臨場快感，每次思及此，腦海裡不禁迴響著斷垣殘壁上，杜牧聲嘶力竭的吶喊........嗚呼！亡台者，台灣人也，非中共也。嗟乎！使臺灣當局深愛其民，則足以拒中共，遞三世可至萬世而為台灣國，誰得而族滅也！台人不暇自哀，而後人哀之；後人哀之而不鑑之，亦使後人而復哀後人也。

(作者台人，博士，彰化人)

Big Eagle remarks: This article was published on ETToday – 2005/7/23.

Road for a Democratic China

How do Chinese think about the democracy in China? BigEagle found this article written by a Chinese Engineering. Perhaps Chinese may have found their way toward a democratic China too. Please read the following:
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關於大陸的民主問題
2005/06/22 於東森新聞

梁山功夫

大陸的民主問題，是臺灣朋友非常關心的問題，也是迫切希望大陸方面改進的問題，同時也是他們拒絕統一或追求獨立的理由之一。然而，民主並不是靈丹妙藥，它不能解決現實中國的生存和發展問題，也不是盡速解決兩岸問題的鑰匙。

中國是一個有著五千年專制歷史的國家，中國的傳統文化中先天缺少民主的基因。在悠久的歷史歲月中，中國歷朝歷代政權從未嘗試建立民主的國家體制，中國的民衆也缺乏系統的民主教育，可以說民衆的民主素養很低，這種狀況持續了幾千年。在西方國家行得通的東西，未必在中國行得通。比如當前中國大陸在村一級普遍實行了民主選舉，導致許多地區的村級政權被一些大的家族所壟斷，因爲誰的家族勢力大、誰的家族人多，誰推舉的候選人（不管這個候選人人品、能力如何）就可能在選舉中獲勝，家族的利益就能最大限度的得到維護，而弱勢家族的權益卻成爲犧牲品。所以在目前的中國推行民主，不僅艱難，而且會出現許多意想不到的副産品，因爲民衆缺乏基本的民主素養和最基本的民主理念的教育。

民主體制和民主素質的缺乏，是中國傳統政治文化的一個遺憾，也是制約中國民主化進程的重要因素。民主不僅僅意味著民主體制的建立和對公民政治權利的尊重。民主更是一種文化、一種精神，這種文化和精神應包括尊重、包容、公平、正義、和平、對真相真理的追求、對客觀事實的尊重。美國的民主、人權發展水平顯然超過中國大陸，但中國國務院每年都會發表有關美國人權記錄的報告，但美國從未說你中國的人權不如美國，所以你中國沒有資格對指責美國的人權問題。這也許就是所謂的美國精神，大度、寬容、對不同意見給予尊重。

臺灣的民主發展無疑走在了大陸的前面，不少臺灣朋友可以居高臨下、毫不留情地評判大陸的民主發展，卻不容大陸同胞對臺灣的民主發展提出善意的批評。讓人感覺臺灣的民主仍處於咿呀學語、蹣跚起步的階段。其實民主體制、民主素養、民主教育方面的缺失，不僅僅是大陸的問題，同時也是臺灣的問題，更是華人社會的問題。今日的臺灣就是明日的大陸，今日臺灣發展民主中遭遇的問題，未來的中國大陸還會重新遭遇，因爲我們有共同的歷史和文化背景，這是許多大陸人士關注臺灣民主發展的重要原因。今日的臺灣大致建立了民主體制，公民應享有的各種政治權利也得到尊重，但是臺灣的行政機關、司法系統的民主化、執政和在野政黨內部的民主化並未真正實現，臺灣民衆的民主素養也有很大的改善空間。臺灣只有建立完善的民主體制和寬宏的民主文化，才能爲中國大陸樹立民主樣板，才能對中國大陸的民衆形成持久的吸引力。

中國大陸正在全力建設現代化國家，所謂現代化國家，包括三個方面的含義，一是富強的國家，二是民主的國家，三是文明的國家。民主在中國大陸並不是忌諱末深的字眼，中國大陸不是拒絕民主、更不是害怕民主，而是積極考慮如何穩步地推進民主，如何使民主的發展與經濟社會發展、保持社會穩定有效統一起來。可以說在目前的階段，穩定和發展是中國大陸的核心利益，而民主在目前並不是大陸的核心利益。民主進程太慢，會給經濟社會發展帶來阻礙，也會給黨政系統內的腐敗分子以可乘之機。民主進程太快，有可能威脅經濟發展和社會穩定。從維護大陸的核心利益來看，所有的政治改革措施都必須有利於中國大陸的發展，有利於維護中國大陸的穩定，否則這種政治改革我們寧願不要。

目前中國大陸的經濟社會發展水平，還承擔不起激烈的民主變革所造成的負面影響。民衆民主素質的提高基本上是與國民收入的提高成正比，臺灣在推行民主體制時人均國民收入已經達到4000美圓左右，大陸目前人均國民收入僅1200美圓，達到4000美圓大致需要20年，民主變革的時間也要比臺灣推遲20年。臺灣以目前的民主發展水平要求大陸是不公平的。即使現在的臺灣，民主發展的負面效應也到了臺灣社會不能承受的地步，經濟停滯、政黨惡鬥、政權空轉、泛意識形態化、決策效率極低，嚴重制約了臺灣的經濟社會發展，試問大陸能承受這樣的民主嗎？大陸每年的新增就業人口就有3000萬人，經濟停滯意味著每年有新增的3000萬人沒有工作，在沒有解決生存問題的前提下，飯碗顯然比民主更重要。發展民主並不是中國大陸的首要任務，在這個問題上中國大陸的精英階層是有共識的。這也是西方以及臺灣積極鼓動中國大陸推行西方民主，中國大陸的精英階層不爲所動的根本原因。

在中國近代歷史上，中國人吃民主的虧太多了，教訓太深刻了。清朝末年的激烈民主變革，降低了清王朝的權威，動搖了清王朝的根基，也爲中國社會八十多年的動蕩埋下了伏筆。中華民國成立後實行的激烈的西方化的民主改革，很快宣告失敗，中國陷入了持續37年的軍閥混戰、外敵入侵和內戰之中，清朝末年累計的國家積貧積弱的局面沒有任何改觀，激烈的民主改革造成的國家動蕩、國力衰弱的後果一直影響到今日的中國，中國的領導人和民衆都必須爲此買單。孫中山、蔣介石、毛澤東、鄧小平對中國國情的認識都很深刻，孫中山在逝世前也認識到了西方式民主在中國的不可行，並傾向于實行權威統治。中國的民主化只有在克服自私、狹隘、好鬥、偏激的民族劣根性，補上民主素養、民主教育的課程，找尋到適合中國國情的民主體制後，才能有良性的發展。當然我們不反對在探索、發展的過程中實現這些目標。

本人是理性的民族主義者，更是堅定的民主主義者，我們希望中國大陸在確保經濟發展和社會穩定的同時穩步推進民主進程。民主雖然是普世價值，但民主應該與本民族的文化和傳統相適應，我們不贊成照抄照搬西方式民主，我們希望找到符合中國特色的民主之路。把14億中國人帶入經濟現代化的發達國家行列是一項舉世無雙的偉大工程，同樣把14億中國人帶入民主國家的行列也是一項前無古人的偉大工程，需要我們不懈地爲之奮鬥。

目前的中國當務之急不是推進激進民主，而是厲行法制，通過建立健全統一、協調、完備的法律體系，構築獨立公正的司法系統、執法系統，組建廉潔高效的行政系統，完善權利的制約監督體系，實現依法治國、依法行政，提高民衆的民主素養。這是實現民主的基礎性工作，也是今後20年大陸政治改革的根本任務。

在目前國情下構建新的民主體制、實現公民政治權利的時機並不成熟。外敵入侵能中斷大陸的現代化進程，同樣激進的民主變革所帶來的社會動蕩、分離主義運動甚至內戰，同樣能中斷大陸的現代化進程。從這個意義上講，激進的民主和外國欺辱一樣，都是中華民族的敵人。應該說，臺灣的政治精英對大陸國情的認識很膚淺，所以對大陸民主的要求也不切實際。

民主永遠是中華民族不滅的理想，我們會像追求經濟現代化一樣追求民主，我們會繼續走我們認爲應該走的民主之路。

祝願臺灣的民主一路走好！祝願大陸的民主一路走好！

** 作者梁山功夫為中國山東人，現住濟南市。大學畢業，水電高級工程師。

Fingerprinting and Citizen's Freedom

It was reported that Taiwan government is planning to add individual citizen's fingerprint on the new National ID card. People concern with human rights would immediate argue the validity and necessity of this policy because a country is not a free country when its citizens are regarded as criminals without proving any crime has been committed.

In the recent history, we member that during Hitler was in power, he ordered to keep fingerprints of all prisoners and Jews. More recently, it was President G.W. Bush ordered to take every foreigner who visits US should have his/her fingerprint taken in 2001. Bush did that as a measure to identify foreign “terrorists”.

Then there was a call for fingerprinting all citizens in EU. That was debated vigorously and was not implemented. During the hearing in Europe, there was an exchange of Q&A:
[Question: Are you personally happy with compulsory fingerprints for all EU citizens via a biometric passport?
Josep Borrell: As you are no doubt aware, this is a requirement imposed by the US authorities. The Council has fallen into line with them, whereas our Parliamentary Committee would have preferred a different approach.]

There were not many oppositions to this measure in Taiwan from both human rights organizations and also newspapers until about 10 days ago, when Ms. Annette Lu, Vice President of ROC, was quoted to say the fingerprinting is not right and is unconstitutional. More attention were paid to this issue by newspapers after Ms Lu spoke at the “International Symposium on Human Rights” held on May 18, 2005. In her welcome speech she commented on this subject by saying:

“Recently, when the government began to consider the necessity of incorporating universal fingerprinting into the new ID system, many in society were worried that such a policy would infringe upon fundamental human rights. The Advisory Council conducted a series of hearings immediately and reported to the president. In that report we reminded the government of the potential problems of incorporating fingerprinting into the new national ID system. Although Taiwan is not a member of the United Nations, the Advisory Council reached the conclusion that we should encourage the government to take steps to enter into the regime of the Rome Statue of the International Criminal Court.”

More discussion on this subject had been made by Bruce Schneier on “Newsday”, January 14, 2004:

According to the Bush administration, the measures are designed to combat terrorism. As a security expert, it's hard for me to see how. The 9/11 terrorists would not have been deterred by this system; many of them entered the country legally on valid passports and visas. We have a 5,500-mile long border with Canada and another 2,000-mile long border with Mexico currently uncovered by the program. An estimated 200,000 to 300,000 people enter the country illegally each year from Mexico. Two million to 3 million people enter the country legally each year and overstay their visas. Capturing the biometric information of everyone entering the country doesn't make us safer.

And even if we could completely seal our borders, fingerprinting everyone still wouldn't keep terrorists out. It's not like we can identify terrorists in advance. The border guards can't say "this fingerprint is safe; it's not in our database" because there is no fingerprint database for suspected terrorists.

Even more dangerous is the precedent this program sets. Today the program affects only foreign visitors with visas. The next logical step is to fingerprint all visitors to the United States and then everybody, including U.S. citizens.

Retaliation is another worry. Brazil is now fingerprinting Americans who visit that country, and other countries are expected to follow suit. All over the world, totalitarian governments will use our fingerprinting regime to justify fingerprinting Americans who enter their countries. This means that your prints are going to end up on file with every tin-pot dictator from Sierra Leone to Uzbekistan. And Secretary of Homeland Security Tom Ridge has already pledged to share security information with other countries.

Security is a trade-off. When deciding whether to implement a security measure, we must balance the costs against the benefits. Large-scale fingerprinting is something that doesn't add much to our security against terrorism and costs an enormous amount of money that could be better spent elsewhere. Allocating the funds on compiling, sharing and enforcing the terrorist watch list would be a far better security investment. As a security consumer, I'm getting swindled.

America's security comes from our freedoms. For more than two centuries, we have maintained a delicate balance between freedom and the opportunity for crime. We deliberately put laws in place that hamper police investigations because we know we are more secure because of them. We know that laws regulating wiretapping, search and seizure, and interrogation make us all safer, even if they make it harder to convict criminals.

The U.S. system of government has a basic unwritten rule: The government should be granted only limited power, and for limited purposes, because of the certainty that government power will be abused. We've already seen the Patriot Act powers granted to the government to combat terrorism directed against common crimes. Allowing the government to create the infrastructure to collect biometrics information on everyone it can is not a power we should grant the government lightly. It's something we would have expected in former East Germany, Iraq or the Soviet Union. In all of these countries, greater government control meant less security for citizens, and the results in the United States will be no different. It's bad civic hygiene to build an infrastructure that can be used to facilitate a police state.
.........................

The government on Taiwan did not use the anti-Terrorist as the reason of requiring fingerprinting all citizens. It said that fingerprinting will reduce the crime. However, if one look closely to the details of the statistics of crimes, you will quickly find out that:

(1) The most frequent crime is stealing/theft. It consists of about 60% of the total crimes. More interesting fact is that about 62% of these cases was committed by the repeated criminals.
(2) Fingerprint is not the only convincing evidence used by the court. Clever criminals and careful criminals will avoid leaving fingerprint at the crime scene. The police could find fingerprints left by other innocent people.
(3) Fingerprinting system's error can cost lots of money, effort and time for legal solution.
(4) Safety statistics does not support the claim that number of crime will reduce by fingerprinting people related with the cases.

So, what is the advantage of that elaborating and costly system? The only advantage is that it provides a convenient tool for police force to arrest people. But more important issue is that fingerprinting citizens is really violate the fundamental human rights of citizens.

Taiwanese American Heritage Week

慶祝美國台灣傳統週之一則感觸

每年五月是美國國訂的亞太美裔月。台灣人公共事務協會(FAPA) 在1998起經多位眾議員的協助，終於在2000年由Clinton總統宣佈五月最後一週訂為『Taiwanese American Heritage Week』，而從此正式成為美國國訂慶節之一。我很榮幸擔任第一屆洛杉磯美國台灣傳統週的總召集人，深受各社團的支持及參與，共同在當年五月二十日在洛杉磯台福基督教會舉辦了第一次的慶祝。

事經五年，這項慶祝活動也逐年擴大，今年的壓軸戲是五月二十二日的園遊會(Bazaar)。回想當年籌劃節目時，我詢遍社團及鄉親，希望能展示台灣的傳統服裝，但是最後只好用原住民的舞蹈來代替我原來的節目。我由那一次的經驗，就鼓勵婦女團體及服裝店，共同去提高對台灣傳統服裝的研究發展，甚至於也向台灣文建會建議過。可是五年來還是沒有看到我的建議被注重，更不用說被推動。

每位讀者一定有經驗過下列的直覺：
當您看到…
女人穿高叉長袍 … 越南人
女人穿紗麗... 印度人
穿和服... 日本人
穿韓服... 韓國人
男人穿尼格裙.. 蘇格蘭人

這種傳統文化是由整個社會的日常生活，經過長期時間的粹煉而合成的一種永續的活文化。如果台灣文化沒有一件可以代表台灣的衣服，那不是很遺憾嗎？

Update on Democracy Ranking

In February I posted the rankings of Taiwan published by Worldaudit.org. In March, they had an update of their rankings of countries in the world. Here are the new result about Taiwan:

Democracy Index: 42 (was 39 in January)

Press Freedom: 38 (no change)

Corruption: 31 (no change).

The organization now added another index called Index of Economic Freedom. I just select a few countries for comparison:

No. 1 Hong Kong
No. 2 Singapore
No. 7 UK
No. 12 USA
No. 27 Taiwan
No. 39 Japan
No. 45 S. Korea
No. 112 China
No. 155 N. Korea

Education - The Foundation of Democracy

BigEagle has been calling attention to the urgent need to revamp the education system of Taiwan since 1995. 10 years have past since then and we have only witnessed more chaos in the system and confusion among the teachers and parents, not to mention the frustration of students. One can not help worrying what kind of country Taiwan will be in the near future when people face the confusion of history, complication in teaching languages, and the lack of morals in schools. Recently, the new argument is the call for the abandonment of teaching and the use of classical Chinese (文言文). It is fair to argue that type of language is not widely used in daily life, but one would encounter that in novels, movies, and even in the literatures of Japan and Korea throughout the life time.

I am glad to come across a nice piece of article from ETToday.com and I like to share with my friends.

作者: 佛劍分說，台南縣善化鎮人

驪歌將響，離情依依，新舊代謝，亦在此際，超額之難，困頓全臺，以此而視，少子之狀，使人恐之，政府腐腦，未能因應，唯重口號，意識操弄，此其強項，對此內憂，無心無能。

教育編制，於前所定，前法於今，未能適用，何不修之？高中編制，二點二五，國中編制，每班二人，國小編制，一點五人，以國小論，一再減班，實質編制，一點二人，甚又不足，加以縣府，
人員管控，人手之缺，更勝從前，以三者看，差別待遇，公平何在？
　　
今子肖虎，習俗憚之，避而生子，應趁此時，落實小班，編制重整，然今之困，為財政矣，縣府困窘，人事經費，難以支付，尤臺南縣，核退管制，全臺之末，推薪難支，教育之長，汝可知乎？
終日之論，去中國化，意識型態，刪廢文言，強調獨立，可有盡責？
　　
今年未動，明年人數，龍子龍女，恐師不足，屆時反覆，突顯無能，選舉又至，以票決定，既是無能，無格任之。
　　
少子之因，非今而出，內政之計，已多年耳，然何以此？政治不安，社會不平，特權林立，政黨內耗，肉食者鄙，未懂民苦，經濟蕭條，貧富懸殊，痛苦加劇，物價飆飛，唯薪獨降，生活艱難，學費所貲，妖孽當道，民不聊生，只聞獨音，未視澤被，在此之境，高官之子，國外留學，貧困之家，何敢生育？
　　
貪官污吏，享用民膏，苦虻努耕，三餐未逮，試問汝等？吾焉敢育？
　　
再論學質，每代愈下，又見報導，欲刪古文，曹丕：文章者，經國之大業也。許多文言之品，載歷多少其治事之要，如賈誼之過秦論，言盛秦之亡，起於不仁，揭竿於甿隸，蘇洵之六國論，言敗於賂秦，倘若自強團結，則可抗之，另諷當朝媚金之策，一字一句，其義皆可為寶。
　
古人智慧，點滴成書，今卻因政治之意識，抹殺文學，與初時白色恐佈之行無異，應以為慎！
　　
眼見時下政策，偏重英文，輕視中文，似乎英文首要，中文低差無所痛養，教育方針出了問題，
以利為前，廢其德業，無怪乎智慧犯罪日多，因不重德業也。
　　
水可載舟，亦可覆舟，人本立意雖佳，過度上綱，反得其反，人本強調自主，然需前提，環境皆善，今之所處，狐林虎險，偷拐搶騙，以班杜拉「社會學習論」，反而染少惡習，成「畫虎不成反類犬」之譏，故袞袞諸公，善民可積德，望此惜之。

古文瀚海泳難盡，孟堅藝志定紛云，
九流十家表派思，支字片言修慧辛。
六經源遠歷不敗，三百三禮立言循，
儒本之道推為首，處事接物為之本。
史錄羅朝興衰因，明君忠臣鑑古今，
爬羅剔抉德為要，昏主佞奸殃萬民。
大集文藻昭明選，唐宋八大皆奇人，
賦駢詩麗詞婉約，左史古文衍此進。
一舉成名天下聞，十年寒窗有誰問，
習識本修八德目，流為禽犢求祿印。
美章紙貴後世欣，政治不應使之貧，
通曉意境敘己言，反芻暢論似水奔。
世知四維國之要，文化教材欲刨根，
是教學子可喪德，莘子之質使墮深？
教者兮上施而效，育者兮使善入心，
矩規厲行成方圓，厚德良行急為甚。
龍頭三寸需嚴謹，重責立目施方針，
教改失敗緒萬端，勿涉細末反失品。

(ETToday.com – 2005/5/08)

Liberals vs. Conservatives

Liberalism vs. Conservatism

In my previous post “Varieties of Democracy”, I mentioned one of the important factors for establishing democracy is to have majority of middle class because it acts as a buffer between the upper classes who want political power and the lower classes may want power to lift themselves up. Consequently, in the democratic society, there are two major groups of people who will actively seek for political power to extend their ideologies and their advantages. In followings are summary of what I read from literatrues:

Liberalism is a political current embracing several historical and present-day ideologies that claim defense of individual liberty as the purpose of government. It typically favors the right to dissent from established authorities in political or religious matters. In this respect, it is sometimes held in contrast to conservatism. Liberalism focuses on the ability of individuals to structure their own society, it is contrast to totalitarianism.

Liberals favor constitutional government, representative democracy and the rule of law. Liberals at various times have embraced both constitutional monarchy and republican government. They are generally opposed to any but the milder forms of nationalism, and usually stand in contrast to conservatives by their broader tolerance and in more readily embracing multiculturalism. Furthermore, they generally favor human rights and civil liberties, especially freedom of speech and freedom of the press (while holding various positions on whether people have an inherent right to the means of economic subsistence). But liberal parties support restrictions on incitement to violence.

Liberals also typically believe in a free market and free trade, but they differ in the degree of limited government intervention in the economy which they advocate. In general, government responsibility for health, education and alleviating poverty fits into the policies of most liberal parties.

Liberals generally believe in a neutral government, in the sense that it is not for the state to determine how individuals can pursue happiness. This self-determination gives way to an open mind in ethical questions. Most liberal parties support the 'pro choice' movement and advocate equal rights for women and for homosexuals. Equality before the law is crucial in liberal policies, and racism is incompatible with liberalism.

There is an ambiguity inherent in the term "conservative" as used today. Classical Conservatism emphasizes the importance of tradition and continuity. An individual may fall anywhere from the right to the center-left on the traditional left-right political spectrum and be a classical conservative. On the other hand, ideological conservatism is specifically on the right side of the spectrum. Thus, to talk meaningfully about conservatism, one must consider both classical conservatism and ideological conservatism.

The classical conservative embraces an attitude that is deeply suspicious of any attempt to remake society in the service of any ideology or doctrine, whether that doctrine is radical libertarianism, socialism, Nazism, or anything else. Classical conservatives see history as being full of disastrous schemes that seemed like good ideas at the time. Human society, in their view, is something rooted and organic; to try to prune and shape it according to the plans of an ideologue is to invite unforeseen disaster.

With the understanding of liberalism and conservatism, now we can discuss issues more on the intellectual level rather than the often displayed expression of “You liberals…!”

Varieties of Democracy

Just like the "Nationalist" has many forms,there are also many varieties of democracy.

In general, democracy is often understood to be the same as liberal democracy. This contemporary understanding of democracy to a large degree differs from how the term was originally defined and used by the ancient Greeks in the Athenian democracy political regime.

The word democracy originates from the Greek wrods that means "rule by the people." The term is also sometimes used as a measurement of how much influence a people has over their government, as in how much democracy exists. Anarchism and communism are social systems that employ a form of direct democracy, and have no state independent of the people themselves.

Liberal democracy is sometimes the de facto form of government, while other forms are technically the case. For example, Canada has a monarchy, but is in fact ruled by a democratically elected Parliament.

Although democracy implies only a system of government defined and legitimized by elections, modern democracy can be characterized more fully by the following institutions: (Quote from Wikipedia)

1. A constitution which limits the powers and controls the formal operation of government, whether written, unwritten or a combination of the two.

2. Election of public officials, conducted in a free and just manner.

3. The right to vote and to stand for election (also Universal suffrage),

4. Freedom of expression (speech, assembly, etc.)

5. Freedom of the press and access to alternative information sources Freedom of association

6. Equality before the law and due process under the rule of law

7. Educated citizens informed of their rights and civic responsibilities

There is another definition of democracy. In which the word "democracy" refers solely to direct democracy, whilst a representative democracy where representatives of the people govern in accordance with a constitution is referred to as a "republic".

We have heard about the "democratization" of a nation:xxxxxx. Democratization is the transition from authoritarian or semi-authoritarian systems to democratic political systems, that have essentials of a democratic system: universal suffrage, regular elections, a civil society, the rule of law, and an independent judiciary.

It is interesting to think about what factors affect democratization. I thnk the followings are very relevant to the process of democratization.

1. Wealth. We learned from all those elections that no money means no campaign acivities, and no publicity.

2. Economic system. Fortunately, a true democracy can only be achieved if the the economy is controlled by the people as a whole rather than by private individuals.

3. A large middle class. This is a typical Gaussian Theorem. Majority of middle class acts as a buffer between the upper classes who want political power and the lower classes may want power to lift themselves up.

4. Civil society. A healthy civil society (NGOs, unions, academia, human rights organisations) are considered by some theorists to be important for democratization, as they give people a unity and a common purpose.

5. Homogeneous population. Some believe that a country which is deeply divided, whether by ethnic group, religion, or language, cannot establish a working democracy. The basis of this theory is that the different components of the country will be more interested in advancing their own position than in sharing power with each other. (This is an important factor in Taiwan)

6. Culture. It is claimed by some that certain cultures are simply more conductive to democratic values than others. Typically, it is Western culture which is cited as "best suited" to democracy, with other cultures portrayed as containing values which make democracy difficult or undesirable. This factor may play important role in countries of Asian.

7. A tradition of democracy. Democracy must evolve gradually. This argument is linked with the argument about cultural values. A country with extensive contact with Western countries will absorbing cultural values and ideals faster.

Finally, some like to use foreign intervention. They believe that foreign involvement can actively promote and foster by those countries which have democracy already. I, however, take the opposite stance, and say that democratization must come "from the bottom up", and that attempts to impose democracy from the outside are doomed to failure regardless of other factors --- Raping a woman can produce baby too but we all condem the raping.

Scholarly Temperament

Have you heard of "Scholarly Temperament" [學者氣質]? I found Dr. Bolliger is right on the money in this commentary on recent controversies happened in US university campuses. ~~ BigEagle ~~

COMMENTARY (Los Angeles Times, April 17, 2005, M5)

Teach Ideas, Not Ideology
By Lee C. Bollinger, (Lee C. Bollinger is president of Columbia University.)


This is a time of enormous stress for American colleges and universities.

Conflict and controversy have been roiling many of our nation's campuses. Columbia, where I am the president, is one of them. Over the last several months, an intense, often angry debate has arisen over the manner in which some professors have addressed the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, and whether those professors have been intimidating students who express opposing viewpoints in the classroom.

Elsewhere, there's been a national media campaign to stop University of Colorado professor Ward Churchill from speaking at Hamilton College and widespread criticism of Harvard President Lawrence H. Summers for his comments on women in math and science. Conservative activist David Horowitz and Students for Academic Freedom continue to pressure colleges and universities around the country over what they say is a left-wing bias in university classrooms.

Of course, it is hardly unprecedented for universities to make news, or for a professor to provoke a political firestorm. But today, that process is accelerated and intensified by forces outside the university's gates — by special interest groups, the media and increasingly strident voices on the Internet. In the week after a professor at our university called for "a million Mogadishus" to stop what he saw as America's colonizing hubris, I received more than 20,000 e-mails and the phone lines in my office became inoperable. The professor had to be moved to an undisclosed new apartment because of threats.

Turbulent times pose enormous challenges to the teaching profession. Professors, like most Americans, have strong views about politically charged subjects. Anyone who has been a teacher knows how easy it is to be pulled into the fray — to use the podium as an ideological platform, to indoctrinate a captive audience of students, to play favorites with the like-minded and silence the others.

In times like these, some question whether universities should even be teaching sensitive subjects like the Middle East or 9/11. But universities, as institutions committed to free inquiry, have a responsibility to examine all issues. Still, when discussing matters of great controversy, it is especially important that we resist the temptation to take a hard ideological line in the classroom; instead, we must embrace what I call the "scholarly temperament."

Of all the qualities that define an academic community, the scholarly temperament is perhaps the most vital to our mission. It requires us to acknowledge the difficulty and complexity of things, to set aside our preexisting beliefs, to hold simultaneously in our minds multiple angles of seeing things, to allow ourselves seemingly to believe another view as we consider it. Because it runs counter to many of our natural impulses, this kind of extreme openness of intellect requires both daily exercise and a community of people dedicated to keeping it alive.

Cultivating this scholarly temperament is among the highest aims of any university. It means professors should use the classroom as a sanctuary to explore ideas and to teach critical thinking, rather than inculcate a particular ideology.

Of course, like everyone else, professors have the right to believe whatever they believe, and to say so in the public sphere. The classroom, however, is not Hyde Park Corner. Nor are our universities merely a paymaster to a collection of independent contractors who play entirely by their own rules. Rather, we as faculty members are part of a community of scholars governed by rigorous and time-tested standards of intellectual quality.

In 1915, the founding document of the American Association of University Presidents described the professor as one who is steeped in "prolonged and specialized technical training," and who is "shaped or restricted by the judgment … of professional scholars..."

As such, professors are subject to certain professional expectations. Just as doctors must act ethically in the care of their patients, and judges must give both sides a fair hearing in the courtroom, so must professors approach teaching with a particular scholarly disposition. On the rare occasion that a faculty member fails to meet that obligation, we should count on the community of scholars — not external actors — to formulate an appropriate response. That is the foundational principle of academic freedom. That principle has been tested in the past — during World War I and again during the McCarthy era, among other times. One of the best-known invasions of academic freedom occurred at Columbia in March 1917, when the Board of Trustees, reacting to a wave of fanatic nationalism around the country, essentially imposed a loyalty oath on the entire university. Many faculty members responded with disgust, calling the loyalty resolution "unjust and injurious" in a petition to the trustees. But President Nicholas Murray Butler accepted the authority that the resolution gave him and enforced it. "What had been folly," he said in his Commencement Day address, "was now treason." A rash of firings followed.

Today, few would deny that robustly engaging with difficult ideas is the basic purpose of a university education. This is, moreover, a moment in American and world history when painful, sensitive issues need the clear-eyed attention of all citizens — and college students and faculty have important perspectives to add to this discussion.

Despite the pressures to choose sides and join the fight, the scholarly temperament is alive and well in our nation's universities. A handful of instances of inappropriate behavior have not endangered our basic mission. Our principles are still strong, our unique sense of purpose is still well placed, and the value that our universities continue to provide is not exceeded by any other institution.

Note by BigEagle: I would expect members of NATPA will remember the "schlarly temperament" when they address to community as official NATPA representative.

Nationalism and Decomcracy

Just in about ten days, the tension between China and Japan jumped from initial diplomatic complains to the large-scale demonstrations in both countries. Many news reports used "Nationalism" to describe the root of this conflict. BigEagle thinks that there must have many people who have only a vague idea of the true meaning of Nationalism - even myself is not 100% sure I know the meaning. So it is time to do some research on this subject. I hope that we can also find out what is the relationship between the nationalism and democracy.

Nationalism is, according to Wikipedia (note: many definitions here were taken from it), an ideology that creates and sustains a nation as a concept of a common identity for groups of humans. According to some theories of nationalism, the preservation of identity features, the independence in all subjects, the wellbeing, and the glory of one's own nation are fundamental values.

Nationalism is a controversial term, as its most general definition is broad and has been controversial throughout history, and specific examples of nationalism are extremely diverse. Often the most negative consequences of the clash of nationalisms, ethnic tension, war, and political conflicts within states, are taken for nationalism itself, leading some to view the general concept of nationalism negatively and others to argue that viewing nationalism through its most negative consequences distorts the meaning of the term.

Nationalism may manifest itself as part of official state ideology or as a popular (non-state) movement and may be expressed along civic, ethnic, cultural, religious or ideological lines. However such categories are not mutually exclusive and many nationalist theories combine some or all of these elements to varying degrees.

Types of Nationalism:

Civic nationalism (also civil nationalism) is the form of nationalism in which the state derives political legitimacy from the active participation of its citizenry, the "will of the people"; "political representation". This theory was first developed by Jean-Jacques Rousseau and put down in various writings, particularly On the Social Contract. Civic nationalism lies within the traditions of rationalism and liberalism. It is the theory behind representative democracies such as the United States and France.

Ethnic nationalism is the form of nationalism in which the state derives political legitimacy from historical cultural or hereditary groupings (ethnicities). This was developed by Johann Gottfried von Herder, who introduced the concept of the Volk.

Romantic nationalism (also organic nationalism, identity nationalism) is the form of ethnic nationalism in which the state derives political legitimacy as a natural ("organic") consequence of race; in the spirit of Romanticism and opposed to Enlightenment rationalism. Romantic nationalism relies upon the existence of a historical ethnic culture which meets the Romantic Ideal; folklore developed as a Romantic nationalist concept.

Cultural nationalism is a form of nationalism where only culture and not any hereditary features (such as skin pigmentation) becomes the central aspect of what constitues the nation. The best example for cultural nationalists are the Chinese who consider their nation to be based on culture. Race is being played down by these nationalists as they consider Manchus and other national minorities as part of the Chinese nation. The Qing dynasty's willingness to adapt to Chinese customs shows the supremacy of the mainstream Chinese culture. Many Chinese on Taiwan consider themselves Chinese nationalists because of their cultural background but they reject the Chinese Communist government.

State nationalism is a variant on civic nationalism, very often combined with ethnic nationalism. The nationalistic feelings are that strong that they often get priority over the universal rights and liberties. The success of the state often contrasts and conflicts with the principles of a democratic society. The maintenance of the national state is a superior argument, as if it brings better government on its own. Typical examples are Nazism, but also the contemporary Turkish nationalism, and in a lesser form the right-wing Franquism in Spain, and the Jacobin attitude towards the unitary and centralist French state, as well as Belgian nationalism, fiercely opposed towards equal rights and more autonomy for the Flemings, and the Basque or Corsican nationalists. Systematically, wherever state nationalism is strong, there are conflicting appeals to both the loyalty of the people, and on territories, as the Turkish nationalism and its brutal repression of Kurdish nationalism, the opposition between strong central governement in Spain and France with Basque, Catalan, and Corsican nationalism.

Religious nationalism is the form of nationalism in which the state derives political legitimacy as a consequence of shared religion. Zionism is an example, though many, if not most, forms of ethnic nationalism are in some ways religious nationalism as well. For example, Irish nationalism is associated with Catholicism; Indian nationalism is associated with Hinduism. In modern India, a contempary form of Hindu nationalism, or Hindutva has been prominent among many followers of the Bharatiya Janata Party and Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh. In general, religious nationalism is viewed as a form of ethnic nationalism.

Sometimes however religion is more of a marker of a group than the motivation for their nationalism. For example although most Irish nationalist leaders of the last 100 years are Catholic, in the 19th century and especially in the 18th century many nationalistic leaders were Protestant. Irish nationalists are not fighting for theological distinctions like transubstantiation, the status of the Virgin Mary, or the primacy of the Pope. Rather they are fighting for an ideology that identifies the geographical island of Ireland with a particular view of Irish culture, which for some nationalists does include Catholicism but has as a more dominant element other elements of culture. For many nations that had to struggle against the consequences of the imperialism of another nation, nationalism was linked to the pursuit of an ideal of freedom.

Islam is nominally opposed to any notion of Nationalism, Tribalism, Racism, or any other categorization of people not based on one's beliefs. Instead of nationalism, Islam advocates a strong feeling of community between all muslims, which is called the Ummah. This feeling of communal consciousness is emphasised by the awareness that a Muslim's daily prayers are shared with others as the sun sweeps across the globe, and during the holy month of Ramadan when worldwide Muslims fast and give charity together, and culminates in the sacred Hajj, the pilgrimage to Mecca in which muslim men and women of all cultures, colours, and backgrounds come together. The word ummah is often incorrectly translated into English as the Islamic "nation" (not to be confused with the "Nation of Islam" which differs altogether from the teachings of Islam and is disapproved of by most Muslims).

Banal nationalism is a concept put forward by Michael Billig (Prof. Social sciences, University of Loughborough) whereby the everyday, less visible forms of nationalism exist, that remind and shape the minds of the nations on a day to day basis.

After we came abroad and received Western education, we naturally have "Western Political Thinking" which believes --
1. Nationalism is an alternative to democracy;
2. Liberal democratic tradition is formed by an idea of universal freedom, individual rigts, equal and individual fulfillment;
3. Nationalism is the ideology of commual existence, collective rights.

Therefore, Democracy is good, civilized, progressive and national. Wheresas, Nationalism is backward,immature, barbaric, irrational, mythological way of thinking. However, democracy is based on Nationalism, in fact, it is mutually needed for starting a democractic enterprise. As we can see from the definitions listed above, Civil Nationalism is democratic because it vests sovereignty in all the people (remember "We the people"... in US Constitution?), but Ethnic Nationalism is not.

My next question: "Which type of Nationalism can evolve to Democracy faster?"

More on Nation

Excerpt from Peri Pamir's
"NATIONALISM, ETHNICITY AND DEMOCRACY: CONTEMPORARY MANIFESTATIONS"

Nations and Nation States

It would appear then that the drive for self determination, which has acted as the principal inspiration for many modern day nationalist movements, challenges the legitimacy of the state by placing in question its claim to represent the popular will of the nation. We will now turn to the dynamic between the nation and the state as a means of understanding the basis for what is broadly known as ethno-nationalism.

Part of the confusion concerning the nature of the relationship between nation and state arises from the different (sometimes overlapping) meanings ascribed to the former concept depending on the particular context, which are briefly enumerated below:

(1) Nation as synonymous with state.
(2) Nation as encompassing the state plus other political entities, such as trusts and non-self governing territories, as defined in the UN Charter.
(3) Nation as representing a people (not a population) belonging to the same ethno-linguistic group, not necessarily inhabiting the same political and territorial space, but possessing the political will or ambition to form a unitary state (e.g., the Kurds).
(4) Nation as representing a culturally homogenized population living in an existing state (e.g., as in the case of the French nation).3
(5) Nation as a community of peoples composed of one or more nationalities and possessing a defined territory and government (e.g., USA, Switzerland).

Given these definitions, a "nation (or multi-national nation) state" can connote:

(i) A form of political organization under which a relatively homogenized people inhabit a sovereign state; or
(ii) A political territory where different minority and majority nations formally possessing the same rights live together.

The nationalist belief, as expressed by Guiseppe Mazzini in the 19th century, maintained that every nation (each particular ethno-linguistic group) had the right to form its own state, and that there should be only one state for each nation. This claim has been historically impractical since, by current accounting, there exist practically no ethno-linguistically homogeneous nations.

The territorial distribution of the human race is older than the idea of ethnic-linguistic nation-states and therefore does not correspond to it. Development in the modern world economy, because it generates vast population movements, constantly undermines ethnic-linguistic homogeneity. Multi-ethnicity and plurilinguality are quite unavoidable, except temporarily by mass exclusion, forcible assimilation, mass expulsion or genocide - in short, by coercion (Hobsbawm, 1991).

In reality, therefore, the definitions are not so clear cut as states are generally multinational (and hence, rarely homogeneous) and nations are quite often polyethnic. Although the 'political nation' corresponds to the territorial boundaries of the nation state, an 'ethnic nation' may spill over several state boundaries (e.g., the Kurds) and therefore, in that sense, is not synonymous with state.

25 Useful Mottos

This posting may not relevant to the subject of democracy, but during the course of pursuing our goals, we might encounter many crossroads or face the difficulty of making a choice. I found these 25 mottos could help people who are facing those difficult situations, and I post here to remind myself and also to share with you.

Here are the 25 mottos:

1‧記住能記住的，忘記該忘記的。改變能改變的，接受不能接受的。

2‧能冲刷一切的除了眼淚，就是時間。以時間來推移感情，時間越久，沖洗越淡，仿佛不斷稀疏的茶。

3‧怨言是上天得自人類最大的供物，也是人類禱告中最真誠的部分。

4‧智慧的代價是矛盾。這是人生對人生觀開的玩笑。

5‧世上的姑娘總以為自己是高傲的公主（除了少数極醜和少数極聰明的姑娘例外）。

6‧如果敵人讓你生氣，那證明你還没有勝他的把握。

7‧如果朋友讓你生氣，那證明你仍然在意他的友情。

8‧令狐冲說: : “有些事情本身我們無法控制，只好控制自己。”

9‧我不知道我現在做的那些是對的，那些是錯的。而當我終於老死的時候我才知道這些。所以我現在所能做的就是盡力做好再等待著老死。

10‧也許有些人很可惡，有些人很卑鄙。而當我設身為他想像的時候，我才知道：他比我還可憐。所以請原諒所有你見過的人，好人或者壞人。

11‧魚對水說你看不到我的眼淚，因為我在水裡。水說我能感覺到你的眼淚，因為你在我心裡。

12‧快樂應要有悲傷作陪，雨過應該就有天晴。如果雨後還是雨，如果憂傷之後還是憂傷，請讓我們從容面對離别之後的離别，微笑地去尋找一個不可能出現的你！

13‧死亡教懂了人的一切，如同考試之後公佈的結果——雖然令人恍然大悟，但為時已晚矣！

14‧你出生的時候，你哭著，周圍的人笑著；你逝去的時，你笑著，而周圍的人在哭！一切都是輪迴!! 我們都在輪迴中!!

15‧男人在結婚前覺得適合自己的女人很少，結婚後覺得適合自己的女人很多。

16‧於千萬人之中，遇到你所遇到的人；於千萬年之中，在時間的無涯荒野裡，没有早一步，也没有晚一步，只是碰巧趕上了 。

17‧每個人都有潛在的能量，只是很容易被習慣所掩蓋，被時間所迷離，被惰性所消磨。

18‧人生短短幾十年，不要給自己留下了什麼遺憾，想笑就笑，想哭就哭，該愛的時候就去愛，不用壓抑自己。

19‧《和平年代》裡的話：當幻想和事實面對時，總是很痛苦的。要嘛你被痛苦擊倒，要嘛你把痛苦踩在脚下。

20‧真正的愛情是不講究熱鬧，不講究排場，不講究繁華，更不講究噱頭的。

21‧生命中，不斷地有人離開或加入。於是，看見的，看不見了；記住的，遺忘了。生命中，不斷地有收穫和失落。於是，看不見的，看見了；遺忘的，記住了。然而，看不見的，是不是就等於不存在？記住的，是不是永遠不會消失？

22‧我們確實活得很困難，一要承受種種外面的壓力，更要面對自己内心的困惑。在苦苦掙扎中，如果有人向你投以理解的目光，你會感到一種生命的暖意。即使只是短暫的一瞥，就足以使我感奮不已。

23‧我不去想是否能够成功，既然選擇了遠方，便只顧風雨兼程；我不去想身後會不會受到寒風冷雨，既然目的是地平線，留給世界的只能是背影。

24‧後悔是一種耗費精神的情緒。後悔是比損失更大的損失，比錯誤更大的錯誤，所以不要後悔 。

25‧日出東海而落西山，愁也一天，喜也一天；遇事不鑽牛角尖，人也舒坦，心也舒坦。

Good Bye, Pope John Paul II

Pope John Paul II died on 4/02/2005, 2:37 PM (Eastern Time). He is a man for human dignity and peace. We should remember his teaching .....

「民主和平護台灣大聯盟」 - Demo on3-26-2005

「民主和平護台灣大聯盟」為台灣的民主自由和平所付出的心力貢獻值得肯定與支持。台灣民眾共同信守、堅持的自由、民主、和平等理念，在三二六當天完整的表達，強力的顯示台灣民眾愛好 democracy, freedom, and peace 的決心。三二六這個日子，全世界都在看台灣，期待全民都能通過考驗，成為真正的贏家。

Right of Free Will – 自由意識選擇權

Right of Free Will – 自由意識選擇權

In his “Universal Principle of Right”, philosopher Immanuel Kant said:
[Every action is right which in itself, or in the maxim on which is proceeds, is such that it can coexist along with the freedom of the will of each and all in action, according to a universal law.

I, then, my action or my condition generally can coexist with the freedom of every others, according to a universal law, any one does me a wrong who hinders me in the performance of this action, or in the maintenance of this condition. For such a hindrance or obstruction can not coexist with freedom according to universal laws.

It follows also that I can not be demanded as a matter of right, that this universal principle of all maxims shall itself be adopted as my maxim, that is, that I shall make it the maxim of my actions. For anyone may be free, although his freedom is entirely indifferent to me, or even if I wish in my heart to infringe it, so long as I do not actually violate tha freedom by my external action. Ethics, however, as distinguished from jurisprudence, impose upon me the obligation to make the fulfillment of right a maxim of my conduct.

The universal law of right may be then be expressed thus: ”Act externally in such a manner that the free exercise of thy will may be able to coexist with the freedom of all others, according a universal law.”………..] * End of quote.

Th philosophy of Right of Free Will under the context of Kant’s universal principleof right has been the driving force of Western civilization. It is also the principle of democracy in modern society.

Recently, the hot news in Taiwan are: (1) the 319 demonstration for setting up special investigation committee on the assassination attempt on DPP presidential and VP candidates Mr. Chen Shui-ben and Ms Lu Shio-lien on March 19, 2004; (2) Passing of “Anti-Secession Law” (ASL) by NCPR of PRC on March 14. Majority of people on Taiwan resent this action of PRC even though PRC officials said it is only applicable when Taiwan decides to go independent. President Chen Shui-ben called for massive demonstration on 326 to protest this law. According to the poll conducted by China Times ( a newspaper company in Taiwan), the poll showed that 62% of those interviewed can’t accept ASL. However, there is only 23% of the interviewed persons indicated they are pro-Taiwan Independence. Many scholars and writers in Taiwan openly stated that they are against ASL mainly the law is against the right of free will in the modern civilized society. This group of people said that although the poll indicates only 23% of people polled is pro-Taiwan Independence and they planned to join the 326 demonstration, majority of 62% will still speak out for those 23% to protest against ASL.

I believe all people on Taiwan should speak out and protest the violation of their Right of Free Will by ASL. Collaterally, each political party in Taiwan should proudly declares their party's political ideology and policy but avoid claiming that they represent all people on Taiwan. By doing that (the latter one), they are violating the same right of other parties. This is a good time to show the world the true democracy of Taiwan.

The Modern Deadly Sins

Although this subject may not link directly to the democracy, but I think it will help educating a better citizen who is the building element of the society. We have heard about the list of "Seven Deadly Sins" (by Thomas Aquinas in 13th century) through our life . The list includes, by alphabetical order, (1) Anger(忿怒);(2) Envy(嫉妒);(3) Gluttony(貪吃);(4) Greed(貪婪);(5) Lust(色慾);(6) Pride(傲慢);(7) Sloth(怠惰).

According to Parade's report (3/20/2005), British BBS found from their poll that only "Greed" remains from the original list of sins. The updated list of Seven Deadly Sins is now (also listed in alphabetical order)- (1) Adultery(通姦);(2) Bigotry(頑固的偏見);(3) Cruelty(殘酷);(4)Dishonest(欺詐);(5) Greed(貪婪);(6) Hypocrisy(偽善);(7) Selfishness(自私).

This imples the dynamic changes in morality as our society changes.

Just a short note for myself. I hope this is helpful to you too. ~~~ Big Eagle ~~

State, Nation, and Sovereignty - 談國家主權

State, Nation, and Sovereignty

Many of us may feel somewhat confused by the statements in emails that claim
“Taiwan is a de facto (not the de jure) State”.
We also read the news from Taiwan which quoted that “Taiwan is an independent nation”, said Lee Teng-Huei, the past President of Taiwan. However, we also saw the present President Chen Shui-bian said “..(I) will not declare independent” on TV. Weeks before that we had also heard US Secretary of States, Collin Power, said “Taiwan is not independent. It does not enjoy sovereignty as a nation. [see Big Eagle Note at the bottom of this article]

Did you get confused by these statements about the status of Taiwan? Only recently, there are two law professors, both are member of NATPA, published their view in the Editorials section of Taipei Times. On March 12, 2005, Prof. Frank Chiang wrote “Sadly, Taiwan is still not a sovereign state”. Prof. Chiang argued that Taiwan is a political entity, not a State, and it has no sovereignty. On March 15, 2005, Prof. Chen Lung-chu wrote “Challenges lie ahead in staying on course”. In which, Prof. Chen claims “Taiwan is a sovereign and independent State. Neither Taiwan nor China belongs to each other.”

Therefore, we face a task to understand the correct meaning of Country, State, Nation, and Sovereignty. Thank to Prof. K.S. Huang’s effort, he found a good reference for this matter. According to Matt Rosenberg of Your Guide to Geology (About Inc.,A PRIMEDIA Company), here are the definitions we have been looking for:

A State (note the capital “S”) is a self-governing political entity. The term State can be used interchangeably with country.

A nation is a tightly-knit group of people which share a common culture. A nation-state is a nation which has the same borders as a State.

An independent State (or country) is defined when it –
*Has space or territory which has internationally recognized boundaries (boundary disputes are all right);
*Has people who live there on an on-going basis;
*Has economic activity and an organized economy. A country regulates foreign and domestic trade and issues money;
*Has the power of social engineering, such as education;
*Has a transportation system for moving goods and people;
*Has a government which provides public services and police power;
*Has sovereignty. No other States should have power over the country’s territory;
*Has external recognition. A country has been “voted into the club” by other countries.

Territories of country or individual parts of a country are not countries in their countries. Example of entities are not countries include: Hong Kong, Bermuda, Puerto Rico, Northern Ireland, Wales, Scotland and England.

When a nation of people have a State or country of their own, it is called a nation-state. Places like France, Egypt, Germany, Japan, and New Zealand excellent examples of nation-state.

Some States have two nations, such as Canada and Belgium. United States is also a nation-state because of the shared “American “culture.”

From the above definitions of an independent State (or country), Taiwan is not yet a de jure State or an independent country because Taiwan has not yet obtained the external recognition (by UN), and Taiwan’s sovereignty is still in dispute because:
(1) ROC is not a State representing Taiwan. ROC government is a government in exile,
(2) Taiwan has no her own government, constitution.
Therefore, it is correct to say that “challenges lie ahead.”

[Big Eagle Note] On the list of "Independent States in the world" published by US State Department, Taiwan is separately listed in "Other" category.

Independent States in the World
..... omit the 191 countries on the list ...
Other: Taiwan (see note 6)

Note 6: Claimed by both the Government of the People's Republic of China and the authorities on Taiwan. Administered by the authorities on Taiwan. (see note 3)

Note 3: With the establishment of diplomatic relations with China on January 1, 1979, the US Government recognized the People's Republic of China as the sole legal government of China and acknowledged the Chinese position that there is only one China and that Taiwan is part of China.

From Man's Qualification to Leader's Qualification

I have just come across this article about how women weight a man for their ideal partners. After reading it, I found there are close similarities of this list of qualification to the qualification of a leader. I would place a comment at the end of each item of qualification listed in the article. Let me know what you think. This will be an easier and more understandable way to help people to electing a leader.
~~~ BigEagle ~~~

新好男人 10大條件

[聯合新聞網 2005/3/15, 特約記者 吳佩樺／專題報導]

男人看女人，不只要有天使的臉孔、魔鬼的身材，還要有一顆溫柔體貼的心；女人看男人也越來越嚴格，不僅外表俊俏，買的起車和房子是基本條件，還要肯穿起圍裙燒得一手好菜。什麼是現代好男人必備的十大條件：

1.會做菜和家事：會做菜是現代好男人的先決條件，女人可以驕傲地跟朋友說：「我老公很體貼會做菜給我吃喔！」
A leader should be familiar with the operation and function of the organization.

2.肯照顧小孩：好男人總是做的比說的多，當小孩撒尿或大便時，好男人不會嫌他臭，會二話不說去幫小孩換尿布。
A leader should take care of those ethnic minority and those physical and intellectural disabilities.

3.3 高：好男人不僅身高要高、學歷要高還要職位高，不過外表這回事是見仁見智，而且是屬於未滿30歲女人的好男人條件。
A leader should have high standard for achievement, a long range plan for the organization, and high moral standard.

4.羅曼蒂克：好男人絕對不會忘記妳的生日及週年紀念日，甚至還會偶而來個驚喜，讓妳感動落淚。
A leader should always keep close touch with people of the organization.

5.專情：好男人只愛妳一個，什麼林志玲、侯佩岑等超級美女在他眼裡，還是家花最美，就算是真的，也要懂得在妳面前說：「在我心中沒人可以取代你。」
A leader should devote all his/her effort to the organization.

6.老實穩重：好男人就算不會說甜言蜜語，也沒關係，只要有一個可靠的肩膀讓女人依靠。
A leader should keep his/her promises and be honest and trustworhty.

7.孝順父母：好男人不只孝順自己的父母，也孝順妳的父母，他可能會嫌自己的父母囉唆，但絕不會說妳父母壞話。
A leader should respect those precedential decisions of the organization.

8.脾氣好：不管是妳對或他對，好男人總是第一個說「對不起!」；當女人歇斯底里，他也總是能不理會。Rmk by Big Bird : I don't know what is "當女人歇斯底里"
A leader should be calm and never over-react to reactions or suggestions.

9.忠實的聽眾：永遠在妳不開心的時候，好男人會靜靜在妳身邊聽妳吐露委屈，永遠在妳說笑話的時候，他會懂得要笑。
A leader should be open-minded and be trustworthy.

10.幽默風趣：好男人不用是一本笑話大全，但不知道為什麼好男人就是有本事在妳無聊或不開心的時候，讓妳笑。
A leader should be aware of any tension and know to resolve it effectively for the harmony in the organization.

~~ Those Comments in English are provided by Big Eagle ~~

Election and Democracy

In previous posting of "Avoiding Sham Democracy", Mr. David Howell talks about how important a sound constitution is for a true democracy. As we all know that voting is part of democratic exercise, but voting process is often easily manupulated by candidates of parties - particularly in those "Young Democratic Countries." In many cases, people were confused by all the dream-like promises and vicious attacks on the opponent. Misleading and half-true statements often appear in the news, advertisements during the campaign phase. Besides those loyal party members, most voters often face the difficulty of choosing their candidates.

When I visit Taiwan, I like to chat with taxi drivers to survey what are the criteria they used to choose their favorite candidate. I was surprised to find that of all the reasons they listed, none of them said he (no she yet) wants to vote this candidate because he can really make Taiwan more prosperous, society more harmony, and the island become more suitable for living. Nevertheless, it is quite important that this candidate can help his business makes more money.

So I suggested that why don't you select your candidate based on the same condition that a corporation used to pick their CEO. In the democratic country, people are just like the shareholders of the corporation. We all have a big stake on this nation. So why not find a CEO who has the best team to help him making this nation most profitable? Therefore I decided to write an article about how to pick a good candiadte. This article was published on Taiwanese American Foundation (TAF) 2003 Annals. It is available on TAF's website, but I am posting that article here so you can read it right way. ~~~ BigEagle ~~~

從智商談各種衡量人品的商數

李英偉 (台美基金會理事、2001年會長)

今年(2003)七月從報紙看到一則新聞報導說，台積電選用人才將基於「3Qs」辦法。這裡用「3Qs」而不是報上「3Q」是避免與俚語用的3Q﹙代替英文的Thank You﹚混淆。「3Qs」指IQ、EQ、及AQ。Q是英文quotient﹙商數﹚的簡稱。IQ就是大家比較熟悉的『智力商數』﹙Intelligence Quotient﹚的簡稱，EQ是『情緒商數』﹙Emotional Quotient﹚的簡稱，AQ是『逆境商數』﹙Adversity Quotient﹚的簡稱。依據台積電人資長李瑞華先生的解釋，IQ代表邏輯、判斷力及學習能力；EQ象徵情緒控制、熱情及同理心；AQ則是毅力、魄力及耐心的表現。兼備這3Qs才是該公司理想的員工。有人會問這些Qs是怎麼計算出來的呢？這個「3Qs選用辦法」會真的比過去用的選拔方式更公平和能更正確地鑑定一個人的才能及人品嗎？

智力測驗經過教育心理學家數十年的研究及發展，到現在已經被公認是一項用來衡量學童智力狀況的測量。智力，或稱智能，是一個人為適應環境所俱備的能力。它也可以說是一種為了達到目的之評估能力。簡單地說就是一個人的學習能力。專家們設計的智力測驗可以測出兒童的「智力年齡」。把「智力年齡」除以兒童的「生理年齡」所得的商數，再乘以100就是該兒童的『智力商數』﹙簡稱智商，IQ﹚。IQ大於100表示智力比平均智力好，IQ小於100則表示該兒童有需要一些或某種輔導。

EQ是公元1960以來新興的學名。公元1995年Daniel Goleman 在他的書『情緒智力—為什麼它會比智商更重要﹙Emotional Intelligence – Why It Matters More than IQ﹚』不只把過去三十多年的各種有關情緒的學說做個整理，還強調每個人具有天生的情緒智力。他以為這種智力表現在適應、感受、組織、及學習四項功能。簡單的說就是一種建立良好人際關係的能力。這天生的本能會因為環境的影響而發揮或是損壞：比如在幼年及青少年時期受父母、教師或朋友的影響。Peter Salovey 及Jack Major在公元1990就把這種後天對EI的影響程度稱為『情緒商數』﹙簡稱情商，EQ﹚。因為沒有一個標準的測尺來量後天影響的程度，所以EQ沒有標準分數可做比較。EQ只是一個簡便的名稱用來表示情緒的好壞及穩定的程度，尤其在耐心、冷靜以及合群方面的能力。

一旦EQ的Q從數學的商數推展成抽象的後天影響程度，成千上萬的文章在近幾年就把過去形容五覺、六慾、七情的文學加以科學化，馬上就多出了十八個Qs。所謂五覺就是視、聽、嗅、味、觸五種感覺。六慾是食、性、知、利、權、名六項慾望。七情則是喜、怒、哀、樂、愛、戀、懼七樣感情。只要把這五覺、六慾及七情認為是人的潛能，我們就可以把「顯能」及「潛能 」的關係以簡單的公式： 「顯能」= 「潛能」X 「 xQ」； 其中 x 代表五覺六慾及七情的一項。比如老年人視力衰退就以摩登的話說人老「視商—VQ」降低；食慾不振就說「食商—AptQ」很低。求知慾已經早就被用到了，叫做「知識商數— KQ」。

其實「3Qs」中的AQ包括EQ、KQ、CQ﹙創新力Creativity Quotient﹚、SoQ﹙社交能力 Social Quotient﹚、及DQ﹙發展力Development Quotient﹚的特點。道學家也提倡MQ﹙道德商數：Moral Quotient﹚，神學家講究SQ﹙靈氣商數：Spiritual Quotient﹚來評定個人安身立命的程度。其他還有年青人的﹙戀愛商數：Love Quotient﹚用做求偶的條件。政治人物一定喜歡用『意識商數：Conscious Quotient』來決定對某種政治意識的認同程度。可是這樣子把觀念的深淺明暗用簡單的Q代替，只會把觀念變得更加模糊不清，還不如返璞歸真回到原來已經明確的定義。

如果一家民營公司如台積電，為了慎重選用員工而採用「3Qs」甄選辦法，那麼一個國家的人民是不是也應該慎重地用一套辦法來選出能幹的政府官員及民意代表呢？西方人說：什麼樣的人民選出什麼樣的領袖，公司都決定「3Qs」是好的準繩，那麼治理國家的人也應該少不了有高的「3Qs」，並且還需要其他的才能吧。美國Princeton 大學Fred Greenstein教授以為成功的領袖﹙包括總統或總裁﹚應該俱備六種風格：﹙1﹚認知的能力；﹙2﹚高EQ；﹙3﹚有政治技巧；﹙4﹚有政策願景；﹙5﹚有組織能力；﹙6﹚與民眾溝通的能力。我們也許可以加上MQ及「意識商數」作為本土化的需求。

接著的問題是如何才能選出好的領袖呢？為了提昇選舉的品質，落實民主政治，我們實在有必要提昇人民的「選舉智力」﹙Election Intelligence﹚或「選舉商數」﹙Election Quotient﹚。請注意這兩個名詞的簡稱﹙EI或EQ﹚與前面的「情智」和「情商」一樣。作者姑且就叫新的名詞「ElI」及「ElQ」。依作者的調查，這兩個名詞是作者首創的。而且作者認為「選舉智力」比「選舉商數」較有意義。

人民的「選舉智力」大致包括﹙一﹚對候選人的瞭解；﹙二﹚重視各候選人的政見、誠信度。不要以眼前的利益換取以後的後悔；﹙三﹚對選舉制度的瞭解。尤其要瞭解一般民意調查不等於選舉的預測，所以不要有『西瓜靠大邊』的心理；﹙四﹚珍重自己神聖的一票。買選票是犯法，賣選票非但愚蠢同時也犯法。人民的「選舉智力」愈高，政府也就愈有效率，國家也愈早達成富強康樂的境界。

從IQ 在教育的使用到目前EQ在政、商界的重視，誰也沒有想到才半百年的時間，人們的視野會從一個魯迅先生筆下的人物 —「阿Q」演變到舉目皆Q的世界。